(2)

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THESIS

THE U. S. ALL VOLUNTEER ARMY:
A SOCIETAL COMMENTARY TO ITS EVOLUTION
AND ITS FUTURE.

by

Philip E. Bunyan

December 1977

Master's thesis

125P.

Thesis Advisor: J. W. Creighton

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

251 450   JCB

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle) The U. S. All Volunteer Army: A Societal Commentary to its Evolution and its Future		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis; December 1977
		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Philip E. Bunyan		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		12. REPORT DATE December 1977
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES 124
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS(if different from Controlling Office) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93940		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report) Unclassified
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)

Does the armed forces of America reflect the rest of American society? This study indicates that the formation of the U. S. all-volunteer service was a direct result of societal pressures which commenced prior to the Vietnam conflict. The basis for an all-volunteer force is to be found in the general decline of mass armies in association with the question of legitimacy. The Vietnam conflict became the finale to the U. S.'s decline process. →

DD FORM 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
1 JAN 73
(Page 1)   S/N 0102-014-6601 |

(cont p. 2)

1

(cont from p. 1)

The military has attempted to appease a number of current social trends, such as service conditions, women in the services, and the isolation syndrome; however, emerging societal pressures remain unnoticed. The all-volunteer service is here to stay; however, its quantity and quality will rely upon the ability of the military to recognize and adjust to emerging societal pressures. Emerging societal pressures have been identified and possible solutions have been recommended including a detailed examination, and possible adoption of a British regimental type organization. In conclusion a seven step flow procedure is recommended to ensure that alienation between the military and the society it protects is minimal.

ACCESSION for

NTIS	White Section
DDC	Buff Section ☐
UNANNOUNCED	☐
JUSTIFICATION	

BY
DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY CODES

Dist.	AVAIL. and/or SPECIAL
A	

The U. S. All Volunteer Army: A Societal Commentary
to its
Evolution and its Future

by

Philip E. Bunyan
Major, Australian Army
B. Comm., University of New South Wales, 1974

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1977

Author: _____

Approved by: _____
                                    Thesis Advisor
            _____
                                    Co-Advisor
            _____
    Chairman, Department of Administrative Science
            _____
        Dean of Information and Policy Sciences

ABSTRACT

Does the armed forces of America reflect the rest of American society? This study indicates that the formation of the U. S. all-volunteer service was a direct result of societal pressures which commenced prior to the Vietnam conflict. The basis for an all-volunteer force is to be found in the general decline of mass armies in association with the question of legitimacy. The Vietnam conflict became the finale to the U.S.'s decline process. The military has attempted to appease a number of current social trends, such as service conditions, women in the services, and the isolation syndrome; however, emerging societal pressures remain unnoticed. The all-volunteer service is here to stay; however, its quantity and quality will rely upon the ability of the military to recognize and adjust to emerging societal pressures. Emerging societal pressures have been identified and possible solutions have been recommended including a detailed examination and possible adoption of a British regimental type organization. In conclusion, a seven step flow procedure is recommended to ensure that alienation between the military and the society it protects is minimal.

4

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.   INTRODUCTION

The decision to end peacetime conscription in the United States and to rely instead entirely on volunteers to meet the manpower needs of the armed services of the country must be considered as one of the most controversial defense policies undertaken in recent years. There is still no firm consensus on either the feasibility or the desirability of having an all-volunteer force.

Without leverage provided by the old draft, the military services must now meet the same conditions in the labor market as civilian employers. What is most significant about a climate of an all-volunteer force is that the services must now compete in the open market for the loyalties and abilities of America's young men and with schools, universities, unions, and business. The question is: Is Department of Defense (DoD) prepared and is it capable of meeting the competition?

The U.S. Defense Manpower Commission in its report dated 19 April 1976 states:

> "The prospects for sustaining DoD annual requirements
> for new enlisted manpower from 1976 through 1985 will
> be affected by the dominant demographic, economic, and
> social conditions prevailing during the next decade."

[Defense Manpower Commission, 1976. p. 386.]

The Commission's report, however, only attempts to expand on two of the three key points, demographic and economic conditions. The report and its five volumes of staff studies

and supporting papers make little attempt to predict, examine
or even isolate areas of obvious social change.

The Commission recognized that the prime supply pool for
enlistments is considered to be non-prior service (NPS) 18-
year-olds. The Bureau of the Census projects that the 18-year-
old male population in the United States will decline 15.1 per-
cent between July 1975 and 1985. This decline is an aftershock
of the post-war "baby boom." [Defense Manpower Commission, 1976.]
However, if during this same period of time, American society un-
dergoes a social and cultural change and military service is
deemed to be immoral, then the size of the NPS pool will be of
little consequence.

Traditional mores and patterns within the industrial society
have given way to new rules of the game. Dr. Daniel Yankelovich,
educator and research psychologist, once stated:

> "Never have changes come so thick and fast and on every
> front. The economy is changing; the population mix in
> the country is changing; the political climate is chang-
> ing . . . people are changing in complex ways that are
> difficult to understand, and yet, unless one understands
> the human side of the future, it's impossible to make
> sense of anything else . . . There is less rigid accept-
> ance of authority of any group . . . less personal pre-
> judice against people who dress differently, think
> differently, or hold different points of view."

[Killian, 1976 . p. 23]

DoD managers should be aware of these social changes
and respond to them in a positive manner, or face the risk
of an isolated military.

Due to the controversial nature of the decision to abandon the draft and adopt an all-volunteer force, books and articles on the subject abound. Little emphasis, however, has been placed on the societal influences which confront today's modern military forces.

A. METHODOLOGY AND PURPOSE

Normally an experimental thesis will follow a predetermined formal sequence of hypothesis formulation, recognition of dependent and independent variables, testing the hypothesis and ending with a conclusion of the findings. This thesis, however, is not of an experimental nature, but rather designed to assist military managers in their understanding of the need to adjust service life and its organization to the needs and social demands of society.

The bibliography of this thesis has been expanded to include as many references as possible pertaining to the subject of the transition of the U. S. forces from a draft environment to one of all volunteers.

Since the author's parent service is the Australian Army, one may question his intentions in studying the U. S. services. Firstly, in reply one can offer the argument that the society which closest emulates Australian society is that of the United States.

"Australians and Americans have quite parallel attitudes to material benefits and economic growth. Both have an optimism based on a deep belief in their own destiny, on

10

evidence of wealth, and by comparison with other advanced countries an experience of public suffering, of invasion or defeat, or even violent revolution. Australians have gone almost as far as Americans in accepting a deeply rationalist approach to social organization and progress, based perhaps on the pioneering influences which have helped to shape both nations."

[Gelber, 1970. p. 88]

The societal pressures upon the U. S. services will eventually cause the services to adopt certain changes if they wish to remain an all-volunteer force. These societal pressures will eventually face the Australian Defense planners, although their adoption will not be as critical due to the minor position Australia holds in world politics and also due to the fact that only 5.18 persons per 1,000 people in Australia belong to the armed forces. In the U.S. this figure is 9.97. These figures are from the year 1975. [U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976.]

It is not advocated, however, that Australia merely adopt the methods employed by the U.S. in dealing with the various social pressures. But at least errors, if made in the U.S., may be avoided in Australia.

The recommendation is that if Australia is forewarned about the direction of possible future societal pressures, then Defense planners can adapt the American experiences to the Australian environment giving cognizance to Australia's social values and culture.

This thesis is primarily based on a comprehensive literature review, as well as a number of structured interviews. Government publications, technical reports, research papers, Department of Defense official documents, books, magazine articles, and various unpublished papers have been reviewed. Structured interviews and informal discussions were held with members of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (DCSPER), Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI), and Mr. Morris Janowitz, Distinguished Professor, University of Chicago. For the assistance provided by the above the author is indeed grateful.

The purpose of the thesis is fourfold. Firstly, to indicate that the formation of the U.S. all-volunteer service was a direct result of societal pressure. Secondly, that there is a need for the services to take note of current societal pressures. These pressures are examined in detail. Thirdly, possible courses of action are discussed, indicating to the services possible solutions which may enable them to adapt to the known societal pressures. Finally, it is hoped that Australian defense planners may benefit from America's experience in her attempt to resolve her societal pressures.

B. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

This section presents a brief and concise summary of the emergence of conscription (i.e. the draft) as a solution to the

12

problem of military manpower procurement. The first modern conscription law was adopted by France during the French Revolution. Most major European nations adopted this practice of conscription during the nineteenth century.

The early colonists in America brought with them from England the militia concept. This meant that every able-bodied person should be armed and ready to fight whenever the occasion demanded. In Jamestown from 1607 until 1775, when the American Revolution began, conscription of one type or another was called for in a number of laws and ordinances. But during the Revolutionary Wars the volunteer system failed to stimulate enlistment; bounties of various types were offered including clothing, land, and even money. In 1777, Massachusetts and Virginia resorted to conscription. By February, 1778, only about two-thirds of the authorized Continental Army had been recruited and Washington recommended to the Continental Congress that the necessary men be obtained by universal conscription in all the colonies. [Little, 1969.]

Limited conscription was used in America up until the Civil War, when out of necessity both sides resorted to the practice. On March 3, 1863, Congress passed the first conscription act. There was much public resentment to this law, and the first drawing of names in 1863 was accompanied by riots in a number of cities, the worst being in New York, resulting in a number of deaths and severe property damage.

Prior to the continuation of the history of conscription
in the U.S., there is a need to outline the opposing views
as to what should be the composition of a military force. On
the one hand, the professional military requires an effective
standing army with additional emergency strength from the re-
cruitment of volunteers. The other position is that in a crisis
the nation must not depend on a standing army, but rather upon
a citizen trained army.

These opposing views clashed in 1916, resulting in the
National Defense Act, which set up a blueprint for an in-
creased regular military establishment. The professional mili-
tary had won.

Early in 1917 it became obvious that America must begin
to prepare for war. The Selective Service Law was prepared
and presented to Congress the day after war was declared in
April, 1917. The law was eventually passed after a bitter six-
week debate in which the bill was alleged as being unconsti-
tutional and soldier slavery. All together the law registered
24 million Americans, selected and inducted nearly 3 million,
and was so successful that it required only three minor revisions
during its period of applicability. [Lockmiller, 1955.]

Planning for future emergencies began in 1926, when the Joint Army and Navy Selective Service Committee was convened. The committee proposed "An Act to Provide for the Common Defense by Increasing the Personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States and Providing for Its Training," which called for registration of all males between the ages of 21 and 35. President Roosevelt appointed a civilian, Dr. Clarence Dykstra, the first Director of Selective Service in 1940. The President felt that legislation calling for induction of men in peacetime needed a civilian director to inspire public confidence.

Dr. Dykstra resigned in 1941 and was replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Lewis B. Hershey.

During the period of emergency from November, 1940, to October 31, 1946, more than 10 million men were inducted.

After the War, President Truman recommended to Congress that the Act be permitted to expire on March 31, 1947. The Congress agreed and passed a law which provided for the retention of a nucleus of Selective Service personnel for protection against national emergencies. Thus, the U.S. depended solely on enlistments for maintaining the posture of the services. However, this situation only lasted fifteen months.

For four years President Truman tried unsuccessfully to have Congress pass a Universal Military Training Act which would provide one year of training to all American men. This issue always fostered bitter debate, but the Cold War crisis forced

the Congress to enact the Selective Service Act of 1948. Thus, for the first time in American history, men were drafted into the Armed Forces during peacetime.

The 1948 Act provided for a period of service of 21 months. All men between the ages of 18 and 26 were required to register. The law provided that highschool students could continue their study, if their work was satisfactory, until graduation, or until they reached the age of 20, whichever was first. Youths in the 18-year-old category were allowed to enlist for one year (limit of 161,000 per year) and avoid the draft by joining the Reserves for six years. College and university students could have induction postponed until the end of the Academic Year.

After January, 1949, the Armed Forces were able to obtain the required manpower and the draft calls were cancelled, but registration and classifications continued. The value of this continuation of registration and classification paid off when inductions were forced to resume within 60 days after the Korean hostilities began.

The Selective Service Act of 1948 was succeeded by the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951. This Act in general increased the sources of manpower available for induction by restricting certain deferments and extending the service period to 24 months. The Universal Military Training and Service Act was extended in June, 1955, until July, 1959. A further extension until July 1, 1967, was granted by Public Law 88-2.

During the mid-1960's, Professor Milton Friedman, of the University of Chicago's Department of Economics, advocated an all-volunteer force for conservative, market-place economic reasons. The military, he said, could get more than enough volunteers by making a more attractive offer. Friedman's free-market argument impressed Richard Nixon who was getting ready to run for President of the United States in 1968. Friedman was associated with a number of men who were advising Nixon on campaign issues. Nixon realized that the all-volunteer idea had great popular appeal, as it promised an end to the draft, which was hated for its own sake.

In the spring of 1969, Nixon, now President, appointed a fifteen-man commission to develop a detailed plan for moving to an all-volunteer force. The chairman was Thomas S. Gates, who had once been Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration. The completed report was sent to President Nixon on February 20, 1970. [Bliven, 1975.]

The recommendations of the Commission could best be summarized in chairman Gates' covering letter:

> "We unanimously believe that the nation's interests
> will be better served by an all-volunteer force, sup-
> ported by an effective stand-by draft, than by a
> mixed force of volunteers and conscripts, . . . "

[U.S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970. p. iii.]

17

In 1971 the Selective Service System was extended for two more years to June 30, 1973. Finally in December 1972, the last draft call was issued and the draft officially ended on Sunday, June 30, 1973.

C. SUMMARY

For almost two hundred years the United States had no experience with compulsory military service except in connection with major wars. Thus, compulsory service has been closely associated in the public mind with total national emergencies. 1948 saw Congress authorize the induction of men for a period of military service in time of peace.

Each time conscription bills have been presented in the Congress they have faced heated debate, clearly indicating that at least a portion of the American society is against the induction of men into forced military service.

This situation has been reflected elsewhere in the western world, where there has been a progressive reduction in non-volunteer armies.

II. DECLINE OF MASS ARMIES

It may appear ironic to speak of the decline of the mass army, when peace-time armed forces are greater and defense expenditure is higher than ever before. In 1975 an estimated 26 million persons were on active military service throughout the world and total military dollar expenditure amounted to more than US$345 billion compared to approximately US$285 billion in 1966. [U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1976.]

A. DEFINITION OF MASS ARMY

An analysis of the term "mass army" is needed if its decline is to be fully understood. The word "mass" has at least three different meanings. [Doorn, 1975.]

The first meaning indicates physical size. This one is the most obvious, and indicates a numerical size and was first used in connection with large-scale armed forces used in the nineteenth century. This increase in size was closely connected with the rise of nationalism. In Europe, during the French Revolution, the mass armed forces developed professional cadres augmented by conscripts and a system of reserves. The idea developed that citizenship involves the right and the duty to bear arms in defense of the nation. This was a political and social development.

The second interpretation of "mass" indicates homogeneity, that is an army with a highly undifferentiated and homogeneous

composition. The composition of the Roman legions is a good historical example. Today the infantry is still less differentiated and internally specialized than the remainder of the army.

Thirdly, "mass" indicating a social entity characterized by social mobilization. Here "mass" has a similar interpretation as in the term "mass media." Mass armies have contributed in a sense to the emergence of mass societies, i.e., societies capable of mobilizing their members for large-scale objectives. Kirchheimer in a paper in the American Political Science Review, expressed an opinion that World War I, a war of mass armies par excellence, taught the political leaders how to mobilize great masses of people and resources, a technique which was later utilized in peace for domestic purposes. [Kirchheimer, 1965.]

Using each of the three meanings, it is possible to indicate that a decline in the mass army concept has taken place.

B. DECLINE PROCESS

Firstly, there has been a reduction of military forces in a number of West European countries. This reduction in military manpower can be seen from Table 1.

Table 1

Comparison of Military Manpower

COUNTRY	1966	1970	1975
Belgium	115,000	110,000	87,000
Britain	425,000	375,000	345,000
Denmark	50,000	45,000	35,000
France	580,000	570,000	575,000
Netherlands	120,000	115,000	112,000
Norway	35,000	35,000	35,000

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World
         Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-
         1975, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,
         D.C., December 1976.

In 1960, Great Britain introduced an all-volunteer military system. Currently further reductions may be forced upon the British Military by economic considerations. The Netherlands is planning an all volunteer force. In nations where there is conscription, such as France and West Germany, the trend appears to be toward an emphasis on volunteer elements as well as a shorter engagement period for conscripts.

This process of decline could best be summarized by Morris Janowitz:

"In advanced industrialized societies, the goals
of military institutions have been subjected to
massive criticism and belief in the moral worth
of conscript service has been shaken. Hedonism,

self-expression, resistance to military authority
and a new diffuse moral criticism have become para-
mount among young people. The use of force has tra-
ditionally operated within circumscribed limits; new
moral and political definitions generate a powerful sense
of neutralism and new forms of pacificism. Literacy,
mass consumption and political rhetoric have emerged
as more important hallmarks of citizenship than mili-
tary service. Nationalism itself is muted and mixed with
diffuse but powerful feelings of transnationalism."

[Janowitz, 1972. p. 430.]

If conscription means larger armies, then the reverse

is also true. Ending conscription means smaller armed forces.

The all-volunteer force was introduced and accepted, primarily

because of the political and social pressures caused by resis-

tance to the military.

Using the second meaning of "Mass" a decline in homogeneity

is also present. In today's modern army, the infantry is but a

small portion. Technological advances, increased firepower, im-

proved mobility, and improved communications have resulted in

new specialists skills, and so today modern battlefields may

be empty of soldiers.

The development of nuclear weapons has seen the decline of

mass armies. The introduction of nuclear weapons per se did

not dictate the gradual erosion of mass armies, it was perhaps,

a necessary catalyst. Not only has it introduced new skills and

dispersal tactics, its destructive potential has served not only

to produce moral opposition to violence but has also been

responsible for new pacifist movements.

Viewed in terms of the third definition, the decline of the
mass army may be regarded as a lessening of political power.
Air warfare has meant that entire populations are targets for
military operations, because of this political leaders must em-
ploy the full support of military and civilian populations. To
gain such support in a social environment of anti-war feelings
would be extremely difficult.

Underlying all three interpretations of the decline of mass
armies is the concept of social legitimacy.

C. LEGITIMACY

Legitimacy has a long history, especially in the field of
constitutional law. Max Weber was among the first to introduce
legitimacy into sociology. The view, adopted in this thesis is
that "legitimacy is the capacity of a social or political system
to develop and maintain a general belief that the existing social
order and its main institutions are generally appropriate."
[Doorn, 1975. p. 90.]

There are at least two dimensions of legitimacy: intensity
and extent. Intensity refers to the degree of identification or
acceptance perceived in the mind of a particular individual. It
could probably be measured roughly by the sacrifice the indivi-
dual is prepared to make in the name of a particular institution.
The extent of legitimacy, on the other hand, refers to the pro-
portion of the relevant population which regards the institution
in question as legitimate.

23

The most powerful legitimate type of institution is a nation. Within the United States government, the DoD wields a great deal of authority. DoD has a "total budget larger than the national income of the Peoples Republic of China and can well claim to be the second largest centrally planned economy in the world." [Tax, 1966. p. 193.]

Men are urged, "ask not what your country can do for you, ask what you can do for your country." However, such clichés are now being questioned, and rightly so.

The draft may well have been the first question, which in turn may have commenced the slow decline of the military institution.

Doorn has indicated that the legitimacy of the armed forces was guaranteed as long as:

"(1) the function of the military coincided sufficiently with what the political community defined as legitimate goals; (2) the military sub-culture coincided sufficiently with the political culture of the larger unit; and (3) the composition of the armed forces was sufficiently representive of the composition of the political community."

[Doorn, 1975. p.95.]

The intervention of U.S. troops into South Vietnam must be considered as a violation of Doorn's first principle. The aspacts associated with South Vietnam will be considered elsewhere in this thesis.

The third of Doorn's principles may also have been violated. The draft discriminates against the moderately poor. The very poor usually escape because they may lack educational background,

24

while the rich may escape because they are able to receive deferments on educational grounds.

For the majority of nations most armed forces accept their subordinancy to the political culture and regard themselves as loyal to the ruling political regimes. A few notable exceptions may be found among the newer developing nations. Thus Doorn's second principle has not been violated.

It could be hypothesized that the adoption of an all-volunteer armed force in the U.S. acted as a societal "safety-valve."

The U.S.'s DoD because of its power and wealth would seem to be invincible. History, however, suggests that it is at this moment of apparent invincibility that an institution is most vulnerable. The Roman Empire and the British Monarchy lost their legitimacy at thier moment of greatest power and extent. People began to ask, "what can the king do for me?" When the answer resulted in "nothing," the monarchy either died or was transformed. [Tax, 1966.]

It may have been fortuitous that the United States adopted an all-volunteer approach to military manpower procurement when she did.

Since the introduction of the all-volunteer system roughly coincided with the withdrawal of U. S. troops from South Vietnam, one must question what social influence did South Vietnam have on the death of the draft?

D. SOUTH VIETNAM

The influence of the war in Southeast Asia can be viewed from the following areas:

1. A general societal overview, and

2. Dissent from within the services.

Since the dissent from within the services was probably a spill-over of the views held by the general society, these general views will be discussed first.

1. Society's Outlook on the South Vietnam War

Janowitz mentioned that there has been an erosion of nationalism since World War II. The memory of the accomplishments of the war has grown dim with time, while on the other hand the memory of the war's tremendous destruction has remained vivid.

Increased literacy and education have popularized values associated with internationalism. People believe that collaboration among nations, not military antagonism, is the key to the future.

The Vietnam conflict, especially with its vivid media coverage provided a strong emotional base from which to build pacifism and anti-military movements.

From 1960 to 1970 the U.S. Military with her vast resources was unable to impose a containment policy in South Vietnam. As a result many Americans were tempted to think the military was not much good.

However, one should consider that although the U.S. did not suffer military defeat in Vietnam, she was denied victory because the situation was without a purely military solution. Technically, the U.S. could have won militarily by having recourse to nuclear weapons. The price and results of such an action made this clearly a non-option.

This lack of faith in the military may have helped to shake the moral worth of conscription. The draft appeared unnecessary, mainly because the military was ineffective.

Other problems resulting from the Vietnam conflict can be summarized as follows:

1. Widespread and serious questioning of the morality of the use of armed force, particularly in the employment of non-combatants. Military force is seen by many as a blunt, insensitive and even immoral instrument.

2. Hostility toward large bureaucracies, a general feeling of dissatisfaction with what are considered obsolete bureau-cratic structures, insensitive administrators and slow procedures. Bureaucracies are seen to be capable of only marginal adjustments, not much needed innovations.

3. A desire for greater informality and personal freedom for members of the military.

4. The military because of its vital combat operations, stresses discipline and obedience. But incidents like the one at My Lai tend to result in a social abhorrence of obedience to what is regarded as arbitrary authority. [Gard, 1971.]

27

The Vietnam conflict in itself merely continued the decline process of the U.S. military. It possibly was the "last straw which broke the camel's back" and forced the military to accept the political program of an all-volunteer force. The professional military was also probably influenced by the dissent which was widespread throughout enlisted personnel during the period 1960-70.

2. Dissent from Within

This dissent from within the forces has commonly been termed the GI movement and represents the most serious internal challenge ever faced by the Armerican armed forces.

The level of dissent is reflected in the number of desertions in recent years. The five peak years of the American involvement in Vietnam saw the Army desertion rate increase from 14.9 incidents per thousand in 1966 to 73.5 per thousand in 1971. This represents an increase of approximately 400 percent. For the armed forces over the same period, the desertion rate increased threefold from 8.4 to 33.9 per thousand. [Cortright, 1975.]

Desertions of course are typical from any military environment, but the above figures surpass those experienced by the American services during and after both the Korean War and World War II. Cortright also indicates that most Vietnam-era desertions did not take place under fire, indicating that servicemen "took off" not because of danger involved in the

war but rather because of disgust. Although no statistical
evidence is provided to support this remark it is neverthe-
less interesting and feasible if one considers the general
social environment prevailing at the time.

This overflow from society is also evident in the
characteristics of the society. There are certain new char-
acteristics of the social environment. Western society has
raised the expectations of the masses and the individual.
Young people believe education entitles them to more material
rewards and a greater portion of the good life instantly.
There is a psychology of entitlement which the services have
not adjusted to. The lack of privacy and the relatively
spartan life-style just do not appeal to many who are accustomed
to material comforts in an affluent society. Consequently,
when individuals having this psychology of entitlement are
placed within this new alien environment, especially when it
is not by choice, a reaction against authority is to be ex-
pected. This reaction or dissent became the GI movment. This
movement was supported by some 245 separate illegal GI news-
papers. [Cortright, 1975.]

The Gates Commission felt that a means of alleviating
this dissent and the social pressures from within the military
itself, which they felt resulted directly from the draft, was
to eliminate the cause and adopt a volunteer system.

29

"The draft creates unnecessary problems for the
military. Selection by lottery compels some to
serve who have neither a talent nor a taste for
military life ... These men present morale and
disciplinary problems which otherwise would not
arise. Some spend much of their military service
in confinement, because it is so difficult for them
to adjust to military service. Dissent within the
military presents particularly ticklish problems for
the armed forces of a free nation. The problems
raised by the forced military service of those who
are unwilling or unable to adjust to military life
will be largely overcome by voluntary recruiting."

[U. S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer

Armed Force, 1970. p. 32.]

Thus the all-volunteer force has been used as a means
of changing the social base of the military in an effort to
eliminate unrest.

Unfortunately, the end of the draft did not halt the
GI movement. The assumption by the Gates Commission that volun-
teers would be more docile and acquiescent than draftees has
proved wrong. Dissent still prevails. The conclusion from
this is that the military must attempt to adjust its environ-
ment so that it is compatible with the social environment
prevailing at any particular time.

E. SUMMARY OF CHAPTER II

Chapter II highlights the difficult challenge facing the
U.S. military, that is how can it achieve two often conflict-
ing objectives? The U.S. services have the mission of provid-
ing for the military security of the United States, yet they
must accommodate the present values of the society they protect.

An attempt has been made in the chapter to show that there has been an overall decline in size of mass armies within the western nations. This decline, which had its origins years ago in Europe has spread to America. It is not a new concept which merely resulted from America's intervention into South Vietnam, but rather it has been a gradual process, forced upon the political and military leaders by societies that they represent.

America has not been an exception to this general decline process. The process probably started prior to the Vietnam conflict, but remained dormant. The death toll in the war, considered by many to be needless, merely brought the process to a climax.

In summary, the condition of society directly determines the state of morale within the armed forces. Servicemen recruited or drafted from a society in turmoil are unlikely to bring with them the sense of dedication and loyalty required by a discipline-oriented organization such as the military. Racial tensions, drug abuse, alcoholism, crime, a lack of unity and purpose, together with other signs of social disintegration show up in the military with devastating results. It is contended that a military force can not make a nation strong if it consistently ignores the critical social needs of the community. America, like Europe, subordinated the interests of the government to those of the people, the result being a smaller armed force, but an all-volunteer force.

III. ADOPTION OF CURRENT SOCIAL TRENDS BY THE U.S. MILITARY

The previous chapter could convey the impression that
the services have made no attempt to resolve the social is-
sues other than accept and implement an all-volunteer system
of manpower procurement. This is not so; a number of programs
have been implemented in an attempt to adjust to the social
environment. A concerted effort has been made by all the ser-
vices to try and improve the general conditions under which
service personnel serve.

A.   IMPROVEMENTS IN SERVICE CONDITIONS

The Nixon administration's first move to try and improve
service morale was the appointment of the President's Commis-
sion on the All-Volunteer Force, now generally referred to as
the Gates Commission. The Commission with its terms of refer-
ence was announced on 27 March 1969 by the President in the
following manner:

> "to achieve the goal of an all-volunteer force we
> will require the best efforts of our military establish-
> ment and the best advice we can obtain from eminent
> citizens and experts in many related fields of national
> endeavor . . . . I have directed the Commission to develop
> a comprehensive plan for eliminating conscription and
> moving toward an all-volunteer armed force."

[U. S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer

Armed Force, 1970. p. vii.]

From this command to the Commission, the recommendation of
an all-volunteer force would be obvious, hence the only task

for the Commission was to justify the transition and provide incentive methods to attract young men to a military career. The main incentive recommended by the Commission was increased pay. This, of course, when implemented provided initial incentives, increased morale of the soldiers, and satisfied those members of society who supported the all-volunteer concept.

The Commission's report had little effect in raising the low social attitude felt towards the services. The society still maintained its low opinion of the forces, and once this attitude became generally accepted, a descending spiral seemed to take hold. The lower the value placed on the military by the public, the fewer good men are attracted to the forces. The fewer good men in the forces, the more derogatory the opinion of society about the military. [Rosser, 1972.]

The efforts of the Gates Commission at least attempted to raise the morale of the soldiers, and this must have had some effect in lowering the dissent from within the armed forces.

Additional efforts were made to lower dissent from within the services, the major ones being:

1. May, 1970, the Army announced that appearance regulations would be revised to allow slightly longer hair.

2. A new emphasis on personnel problems in the Navy was attempted with the surprise appointment of Admiral Elmo Zumwalt as Chief of Naval Operations in April, 1970. Zumwalt was promoted over thirty-three other admirals.

[Cortright, 1975.] Zumwalt through a series of highly publicized personal messages announced the relaxation of uniform regulations, approval of beer in the barracks, the opening of hard rock clubs, liberalized leave policies, and a ban on all forms of unnecessary harassments.

3. Army Chief Westmoreland in December, 1970, followed the Navy with directives eliminating morning reveille, easing pass restrictions, and legalizing beer in mess halls.

4. In the Fall of 1970 the Army instituted a controversial "amnesty" program whereby soldiers with drug problems were encouraged to enter a rehabilitation program, with the promise that no punitive action would be taken against participants.

The effect of these human relation programs are difficult to judge. They probably had some effect, but their "fire fighting" nature probably prevented the full objectives of the programs from being realized.

The U.S. forces faced with the task of recovering from the problems of the Vietnam era, coupled with the transition to the all-volunteer force, have only had time to adopt a "fire fighting" approach to the endemic problems, such as drugs and racial animosity. Under the circumstances, the effort must be applauded. However, if the forces are to be successful in regaining both the soldier's and society's confidence, a coordinated systems approach is needed at the highest DoD level.

34

Evidence of successful programs are available at various command levels. These successful programs should be researched and if applicable applied force wide. One of the efforts at a local command level worthy of investigation was that carried out by Major General Bernard Rogers at Fort Carson. General Rogers preceded the Army directives, and in early 1970 abolished reveille, Saturday inspections, and allowed soldiers to decorate their living quarters in whatever manner they wished.

The most far-reaching of the General's new policies was an attempt to introduce a measure of enlisted men's participation into personnel policies. Sp5 William Rosendahl was appointed "Enlisted Assistant to the General." His task was to function as a top-level representative of low-ranking GIs and to investigate the complaints of enlisted people. The incumbent was provided with a secretary, telephone, staff car, and had direct access to the post commander. [Cortright, 1975.] This ombudsman position, if extended, could be a step towards achieving a more humane and democratic military, acceptable to the society in general.

Of all the new policies resulting from the decline of military service, none is more striking than the Pentagon's decision to increase the number of women in the military.

B. WOMEN IN THE SERVICES

In the transition to an all-volunteer force, increased emphasis has been placed on the use of women, both as officers and enlisted personnel.

The total number of women on active service has increased
from 14,458 in 1948 gradually to an estimated expected number
of 130,700 in 1978. These figures represent 1.0% of the total
military force in 1948 and 6.2% of the proposed military force
in 1978. [Defense Manpower Commission Staff Studies and Sup-
porting Papers, 1976. Vol. IV.]

The history of women in the U. S. Army provides an insight
into the employment of women into the services.

1. History

The formal organization of women into the U.S. services
was in 1901 when the Army Nurse Corps was formed. This new
Army Nurse Corps was not an integral part of the Army, but rather
an auxiliary whose members were denied many of the regular service
benefits, such as rank, officer status, or equal pay. The end
of World War I saw the end of the question of women in the Army.

World War II resulted in the formal recognition of
women into the armed forces. The bill to establish the Women's
Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC) was approved by Congress on 14 May
1942, a year after its introduction to the House of Representa-
tives. The major opposition to the bill was similar to those
fears being expressed today; namely, "reduction in a force's
efficiency, concern for women's safety, and perceived inability
of women to cope in combat situations." [Castle, 1976. p. 12.]

With the termination of hostilities in 1945, it was felt
that women were no longer needed, so in August 1945, enlistment
of women ceased.

February 1946 there was a critical shortage of skilled military personnel, and legislation was prepared to re-establish the Women's Army Corps (WAC). This was done by means of the Women's Armed Services Integration Act.

The Korean War saw the strength of the WAC increased due to the need for volunteers for that war zone. An increase was also experienced as a result of the Vietnam conflict. WAC volunteers served in Vietnam in clerical and administrative functions.

The preceding outline emphasizes that acceptance of women in the military in the past has always been as a last resort in times of crisis. What explanation can be given for the large number of women currently employed in the armed forces?

2. Current Utilization of Women

The projected number of women to be employed in the services in 1978 is 130,700. There are legal restrictions which prohibit the use of women in combat roles within the services, but what about other roles?

> "In 1971, 86% of the Army's enlisted women were concentrated in four traditional career fields--41% in administration, 31% in medical care and treatment, with 14% in the communications and supply fields. It can be seen from these figures that actually 72% of the women were concentrated in only two career fields."
>
> [Castle, 1976. p. 32.]

This concentration of women into selected employment is not the fault of the services. For example as recently as 1972 approximately twenty-five percent of the Army's Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) were open to women. Today approximately 92% of the Army's MOS's are available to women. This represents a total of 403 MOS's out of 438. The problem faced by service manpower planners is that women are still remaining in traditional women's roles. Here is an example where the military has attempted to adjust to social pressure, but where in fact they may have progressed too far. Society may not be willing to allow women beyond these traditional roles within the military environment.

In assessing the employment of women in the military, one must consider whether their employment has been linked with society's attitudes on the employment of women, or that the increase is due to a shortfall of men resulting from the all-volunteer recruitment system.

If the latter is the case, and bearing in mind that previous employment of women in the services has been as a result of a crisis, it follows that the all-volunteer system must be considered by military planners as a crisis. If this hypothesis is accepted, then adjustments must be planned to correct the situation. To the author's knowledge no adjustments are imminent, although a strong lobby exists in Congress for the return of the draft.

Having dispensed with the notion that the utilization of women in the services is solely a result of the all-volunteer concept, one must consider the sociological aspects.

3. Sociological Aspects to the Acceptance of Women in the Services

Brig. Gen. Clarke, Director WAC, referred in January 1976 to a quotation about equality. "The world of humanity has two wings: one is women and the other men. Not until both wings are equal can the bird fly." [Johannessen, 1976.]

Society has begun to accept the role of women, and cases of women performing satisfactorily in male-dominated careers are no longer newsworthy. The full benefit of women in the military depends upon society's acceptance of women in combat.

An attempt to try and assess society's attitude to combat was undertaken by The Women in the Army Study Group [1976]. Various segments of the civilian and military population were surveyed and their attitudes were compared and analyzed.

Questions asked in the surveys on the role of combat were classified into two categories:

1. The philosophical (or "should" they participate) and

2. The pragmatical (or "can" they participate).

In 1973 a survey of persons eighteen years of age or more residing in the Detroit area was conducted by the University

39

of Michigan in an attempt to answer the philosophical question. The survey found that approximately 74% of the sample agreed that men rather than women should bear arms.

In an attempt to answer the pragmatical question, researchers usually address the question of the ability of women to serve in a combat role. Women surprisingly have less confidence in themselves than men have in them as to their perceived ability to perform as good frontline soldiers. Other topics surveyed included command, leadership, and job performance.

Survey results suggest that men actually support women in command positions, but not as strongly as do women, particularly the female officers. Twenty percent of the women surveyed indicated they believed the overall effectiveness of the army would increase if more women held command positions. On the topic of job performance, men generally believe that women perform given tasks well.

The conclusion from this section on women is that the general upsurge in the number of women being currently employed in the armed forces is not merely the result of a lack of men, due to the all-volunteer concept, but rather a general acceptance of the role of women in society. The full utilization of women in the service can not be undertaken until the societal attitude on the use of women in a combat role is resolved.

An interesting sideline to the question of the employment of women in the armed forces is the assertive male superiority, which to some members is an essential element of

40

military culture, and which plays a key role in conditioning hostility and insensitivity among servicemen. This topic could be a thesis study in itself.

C. ISOLATION SYNDROME

A constantly used argument against the all-volunteer is the concern about the isolation of the military. People argue that men in an all-volunteer force would be self-selected; this could result in a force composed of undesirable psychological types. A mercenary army might develop. The men in the military might begin to serve the military's interests against those of society. Even in an armed force of draftees, the careerists must also be considered mercenaries.

Many fear the growth of a separate military ethos which could pose a threat to civilian authority, the nation's freedom, and its democratic institutions. Critics of the all-volunteer concept feel that the high turnover of manpower generated by the draft is a healthy phenomenon. The continual flow of men in and out of the forces provide a link between services and the civilian society and prevents the growth of a separate military ethos. It can not be denied that the above flow is not a healthy one; however, as to the establishment of a military ethos, this could best be countered in the terms of the Gates Commission:

> "men in both forces will be largely the same types ...
> the men who join the volunteer force will not all
> become long service professionals. An estimated

215,000 men will leave after serving a single tour. As a result, about half the men in the volunteer force will be in their first tour of duty. The large infusion of new men will help insure that neither force becomes isolated from society."

[U.S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970. p. 135.]

It can also be argued that a transition to an all-volunteer force may not be the only incentive for an organization to become isolated. "Isolation is an attractive defense mechanism for any organization under attack by other organizations or by society. 'Close Ranks' is a natural cry." [Rosser, 1973. p. 157.]

The isolation of the military into its often-isolated bases can occur as a result of society's hostility shown to the forces during the Vietnam conflict. Such an isolation attitude could probably develop if a severe reduction in appropriations for the armed forces was to occur. Hence is is maintained that the threat of isolation by the military from the rest of society is nearly always present.

The inference of an isolated military divorced from society is that such a situation is intolerable. This may not be so. Huntington has argued that:

"The very isolation and rejection which reduced the size of the services and hampered technological advance made these same years (1870-1900) the most fertile, creative and formative in the history of the American armed forces. Sacrificing power and influence, withdrawing into its own hard shell, the officer corps was able and permitted to develop a distinctive military character. The American military profession, its institutions and its ideals, is

42

fundamentally a product of these years. No other
period has had such a decisive influence in shaping
the course of American military professionalism
and the nature of the American mind. The practical
work of professional reform, frustrated while the
military were associated with the South in the pre-
war years, became possible once all ties with civilian
society had been broken. Universal hostility per-
mitted what limited support prevented. The founda-
tion of this advance was the absence of any signi-
ficant threat to national security. The isolation
of the military was a prerequisite to professioni-
zation and peace was a prerequisite to isolation.
Paradoxically the United States could only create a
professional military force when it was lacking
any immediate need for such a force. The dark ages
of military political influence were the golden ages
of military professionalism. The withdrawal of the
military from civilian society at the end of the nine-
teenth century produced the high standards of profes-
sional excellence essential to national success in the
struggles of the twentieth century."

[Huntington, 1964. p. 229.]

Rejection of the military by society and consequent reduc-

tion of funds may in fact have startling results. To continue

Huntington:

"The shortage of funds made it impossible for the
military to experiment and develop new techniques
and weapons of warfare. Both services, for example,
continued to use smoothbore cannon long after foreign
powers had replaced them with rifled cannon. The Army
was seldom able to bring together more than a battalion
of troops at a time; the Navy after the Civil War went
back under canvas, and the desire for economy made it
almost a crime for a naval officer to utilize the en-
gines of his ship."

[Huntington, 1964. p. 226.]

With such historical evidence it is difficult to avoid the

conclusion that we should attempt to reconstruct the same en-

vironment so as to reap the same rewards today.

There are even some who consider that the problem does not appear to be military isolation from the civilian community, but rather the reverse. It can be argued that man's tendency towards increased social involvement and concern is a danger to national security and the military profession, in that the unique characteristics and capabilities of the profession may become eroded beyond repair by over immersion in such a rapidly changing value system.

In order to maintain armed forces in the future, some suggest it is necessary to blur its functional role in an array of increased social-welfare responsibilities so that the forces may come to be regarded as just another part of the government. The military must avoid this process at all cost and maintain the values of order and discipline. These values are absolutely necessary if the forces are to maintain and provide national security.

There is considerable evidence that the current military bases tend to isolate the military profession from the larger civilian society. Bases have been established in which all the service houses together with associated amenities are located in one area or camp. This does not mean to imply that these benefits are not essential for military personnel and are extremely important for retention purposes. However, it must have some effect on not ensuring integration of the military families into the general society.

In an attempt to assimilate, DoD in recent years has sought to expand off-base housing under the assumption that such facilities are less expensive, or that they relieve the military of the complex of overhead activities associated with military community housing, thus releasing much needed personnel for other military directed tasks.

It can be argued that purely relocation of a soldier's residence into a civilian community will not ensure integration into that civilian neighborhood. It may, in fact, produce an off-base ghetto of military families who may be disgruntled at being separated from their base facilities, such as their medical care and exchange privileges. Hence, there is no reason to believe that relocation of the military into off-base housing enhances integration of the military family into civilian society. Off-base housing is unlikely to be a success so long as the high rate of service rotation persists.

The question of integration into civilian society by the military could best be considered as rather a question of civic participation rather than location of housing.

1. Civic Participation

Military regulations and practice encourages civic participation within the boundaries of nonpartisanship, i.e. without direct affiliation to political party groups. Currently even this is being fought on the grounds that it is a violation of individual rights.

45

The service way of life is not naturally conducive to civic participation. High rotation from one duty station to another, the long working hours particularly over the weekends, and the frequency at which the head of the household is absent all hamper the military family from becoming involved in community projects and associations.

As discussed elsewhere in the thesis the introduction of a regimental system with less job rotation may increase the possibilities for more meaningful community integration.

Janowitz [1972] supports the case that "military personnel should be permitted to serve on local school boards, run in non-partisan local elections, and be members of government advisory boards and public panels," if they possess the essential qualification, competence and interest.

In West Germany, all military personnel are permitted to stand for political elections while still serving on active duty. Thus, the army man is a civilian in uniform. To swing the pendulum to this extreme in the U.S. may present a number of problems. The need to avoid a political party affiliation is probably warranted.

A charge often leveled at serving members of an all-volunteer force is that they are "mercenaries." Military personnel are highly sensitive to such a charge, thus they should have the right to express the objectives and purposes of the military within a democratic society by becoming deeply involved in community and public affairs. "In short, new definitions

46

of civic participation need to emerge which are broader than the existing ones, but still compatible with the non-partisan stance of American military law and traditions." [Janowitz, 1972. p. 114.]

Prior to attempting to define the role of the new military, as a result of all-volunteer procurement, there is a need to establish the social composition of an all-volunteer force.

2. Social Composition of an All-Volunteer Force

The characteristics of the military establishment as a result of all-volunteer recruitment can be summarized as follows:

* The armed forces will be smaller than the U.S. has had since before the Korean War.
* The forces will be increasingly non-white in complexion.
* It will be well paid.
* As a result of the percentage of the budget going to manpower, the direction will be for an increase in a capital intensive force.
* Enlisted personnel will perhaps have fewer years of formal education. Other aspects of quality may also suffer.
* A smaller proportion of national resources will probably be assigned to National Security than at any time over the last decade.

These characteristics will have a marked effect on the composition of both the enlisted ranks and the officer corps.

a. Changes in the Enlisted Ranks

The Gates Commission posed the following answer to the question, that the higher pay required for a voluntary force will be especially appealing to blacks who may have relatively poorer civilian opportunities.

"The frequently heard claim that a volunteer force will be all black or all this or all that simply has no basis in fact. Our research indicates that the composition of the armed forces will not be fundamentally changed by ending conscription."

[U.S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970. p. 15.]

The Congressional Quarterly reports that during 1976 blacks made up 16.6 percent of the U.S. enlisted forces and 3.4 percent of the Officer Corps. Both levels are substantially above the corresponding ratios of 1964 when 9.7 percent were enlisted and 1.8 percent were officers. [Towell, 1977.]

This increase in the proportion of blacks in the armed forces is automatically felt to be bad. This high ratio, people feel, will exacerbate racial tensions within the services and provide in the form of ex-soldiers a military-trained group to foment violence. Perhaps there is something to this. The argument to the contrary rests on a more basic question of principle. Clearly, it is a good thing not a bad thing to offer better alternatives to the currently disadvantaged.

On the question of quality, the Gates Commission concluded:

> "Maintenance of current mental, physical, and moral standards for enlistment will ensure that a better paid volunteer force will not recruit an undue proportion of youths from disadvantaged backgrounds."
>
> [U.S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970. p. 16.]

A study contracted by the Institute for Defense Analyses counters the above findings of the Gates Commission. Based on a detailed statistical comparison of civilian and military employment earning potential, the Institute report concludes: (1) non-high school graduates suffer a financial loss if they choose civilian employment over continued military service; (2) enlisted men who have attended college experience a financial loss if they remain in military service; (3) military and civilian earnings for high school graduates are roughly the same; and (4) military earnings for blacks with a high school education or less will far exceed their earnings in the civilian labor force.

If the assumption holds true that social groups will generally behave in their own economic self-interest, the potential members for the volunteer force will mainly be drawn from the less educated and minority groups of society. [Kim, et al., 1971.]

The current standards will have to be lowered if DoD is to maintain the current manpower level at an acceptable

cost level. Army Secretary Clifford L. Alexander, Jr., told the House Armed Services Committee that because the Army fell 6 percent below its goal of 62 percent high school graduates in fiscal year 1976, it would have to spend an additional $71 million through fiscal 1979 to cover the costs of recruiting and training replacements for those non-graduates, who it was predicted would be early drop-outs. The proportion of Army recruits holding high school degrees dropped from 67 percent in 1964 to 50 percent in 1974, and all services showed declines in recruit quality during the first quarter of 1977. [Towell, 1977.]

The Pentagon has estimated that out of the 10.6 million men between the ages of 17 and 21 in the U.S. at the commencement of 1977, only 7.3 million would be physically qualified for military service. [Towell, 1977.] In order to increase the supply pool, DoD may be forces to lower standards.

In support for the all-volunteer force, the Gates Commission looked at recent experiences in other countries operating under a volunteer system. The Commission concluded: "The recent experience of the British, Australian and Canadian Armed Forces suggest that competitive wages will attract an adequate quantity and quality of volunteers."

The number of service personnal per 1,000 of population for the four countries are shown in Table 2.

Table 2

Comparison of Armed Forces 1975

COUNTRY	No. per 1000 people
Australia	5.18
Britain	6.15
Canada	3.38
United States	9.97

Source: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World

Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-

1975, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington,

D.C., December 1976.

Since the ratios of the three comparison countries
are much lower, it is no wonder they are able to attract ade-
quate volunteers.

The British experience notes that typical recruits
are untrained school-leavers coming from older and impoverished
urban areas. Over a third of "British volunteers join the
armed forces before their seventeenth birthday." [Lee, 1971.
pp. 28-33.]

Thus, in conclusion, the volunteer would be expected
to fall somewhere between that expected by the Gates Commission
and that of an all-black or all-poor force.

b. Changes in the Officer Corps

Changes in the social base for officers are more difficult to predict than changes in the enlisted ranks.

The service academies have increased the size of the student body at these institutions. This ploy is probably designed to off-set an expected reduction from Recruit Officer Training Centres (ROTC), which currently supplies the majority of officers.

ROTC units at prestige colleges and universities have decreased in number as a result of anti-military agitation. Such a move would most likely restrict recruitment of ROTC cadets coming from upper or middle class backgrounds.

The expansion of the armed forces over the last twenty years has increased not only the number of military families, but also the number of military dependents. Excessive selection from these military families must result in a separation of the Officer Corps from civilian society by limiting the basis of social recruitment.

European experience has shown that a decline in the proportion of commissioned officers coming from the ranks occurs with an all-volunteer force. [Hackel, 1970.] If the same pattern will occur in the U.S. remains to be seen.

3. Models of the Emergent Military

Charles Moskos explains that, "underlying much of social change theory are developmental constructs that are implicit predictions of an emerging social order; for example, a

classless society, a bureaucratic society, a garrison state."
His paper attempts to predict the shape of the military in
the future.

Three models are presented by Moskos. One extreme
indicates a military organization highly differentiated from
civilian society, while a military system highly convergent
with civilian structures is at the other end of the scale.

Several levels of variation are evident, resulting
in the convergence or divergence of the military from society.
These are:

1. The way in which the membership of the armed forces is
    representative of the overall society.

2. The degree to which there are institutional parallels
    between civilian structures and the social organization
    of the military.

3. The differences in required skills between military and
    civilian occupations.

4. The degree of difference between ideological similarities
    between military and civilian men.

Because of these variables, data collection to support
a case for either convergence or divergence is difficult. How-
ever, Moskos presents three developmental models.

a. Model 1: The Convergent or Civilianized Military

This model suggests an all-volunteer democratic
military, where the life styles of service personnel will be

the same as those of the civilians. The civilianization process began after World War II and has been given impetus by the domestic turbulence of the Vietnam conflict years.

The process resulted from the need for men in the services to operate new weapon systems which resulted from technological advances. Leaders trained in managerial and modern decision-making skills were needed to replace charismatic leaders.

The Cold War era saw Morris Janowitz's comprehensive study, "The Professional Soldier," in which he stated that the military trend was away from authority based on "domination" toward a managerial philosophy stressing persuasion and individual initiative.

Internal dissent during the Vietnam conflict saw attempts by the military command to institute programs designed to accommodate the new emerging youth values. These have already been discussed earlier in section A of this chapter.

The next convergent step is that of collective bargaining. This step has already been taken in several Western European countries, with the formation of military trade unions. The introduction of trade unions into the U.S. service environment is a topic of discussion in Chapter IV.

The other end of Moskos's continuum is the divergent or traditional military.

b. Model II: The Divergent or Traditional Military

Evidence can be found to support this model. There is a move towards the traditional model which attempts

54

to isolate itself from society. Indicators of this growing divergence are summarized here.

Firstly, recruitment of the officer corps no longer provides a representative sample of the American population. Disproportionate numbers of new officers are coming from rural and small town backgrounds. The number of cadets at service academies who come from career military families is increasing. [Moskos, 1973.]

Secondly, the draft forced into the enlisted ranks certain numbers of upper class recruits; thus, there was less of a caste-like distinction between officers and enlisted men due to education equality. With the poorer and less educated being attracted by the pay incentives of an all-volunteer system, a divergence in the caste system may result.

The third indication of a divergent military is the return to traditional occupations within the services. The return to traditional occupations is a result of the increased technical specialization cost associated with such specialization.

Since the portion of the Defense Budget allocated to personnel represents approximately 60%, there has been considerable effort directed to replacing men with machines. It has often been the technical jobs, such as specialized radio operators, warning systems personnel which have been replaced, thus freeing personnel for traditional combat tasks.

Fourth, the divergence has been helped by the number of privileges which have been extended to the serviceman and his family. These privileges include free medical, housing support, PX and commissary shopping. Service personnel in order to obtain the best benefit from these privileges tend to isolate themselves within their post community.

Finally, there is a widespread mood among career officers and noncommissioned officers that the armed forces have been made the convenient scapegoat for the failure of the Vietnam conflict, although such a mood is difficult to document and support.

All the above indicators support the fact that the military is undergoing a change, a change often unfortunately supported by the military.

> "There was, at one time, a great hesitancy by most officers to accept many of society's contemporary values and goals. Today many are accepted without strong objection. We veered from those tried and proven attitudes, values and goals, saying, 'Times have changed.' Little by little, it appears that our entire course has been changed because we are losing sight of the reason for our existence."

[Dunwell, 1977. pp. 60-61.]

Such a change may not be in the Nation's best interests.

c. Model III: The Segmented or Pluralistic Military

Moskos explains his third model simply that "the pluralistic military will be both convergent and divergent with civilian society. It will simultaneously display organizational trends which are civilianized and traditional." The

56

model does not adopt the central position between Model 1
and Model II, rather the military will be segmented into areas
which will be either convergent or divergent. For example,
the Air Force may move towards a civilianization concept, while
the Marine Corps will continue its traditional approach to
military service.

From this concept may develop two militaries, each
organized along opposite lines and both having recruiting ap-
peal from different elements of society, but the overall military
would have as its supply pool the entire society, not just an
element as would be the case with either Model I or Model II.

The civilianized military might be responsible
for nonmilitary objectives, such as job training, health care
services, restoring ecologically devastated resources, and as-
sisting with natural disaster relief programs.

The alternatives are there. A decision should be
made at the highest level in order that a coordinated effort
can be directed to ensure that resources are correctly allocated
to programs that support the objectives.

IV. PROCESSES FOR APPEASING SOCIAL PRESSURES

This chapter provides an insight into those areas in which adjustments are needed in order to appease strong social pressures. The assumption underlying most of the proposed solutions is that the armed forces will remain on an all-volunteer base. It is hoped that the implementation of the recommended solutions will result in an increase in the number of recruits entering the armed forces and a closer harmony of civilian-military relations.

A. CASTE SYSTEM

To the enlisted man nothing is more of a harassment in military life than the military caste system. The officer-enlisted distinction which places the officers in a special position requires investigation and adjustment.

There are five reasons generally given for maintaining this officer-enlistment system.

First, it must be a valid concept because it is universal. The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) is perhaps the only country which has made a serious attempt to institute caste reforms. Programs have been established whereby officers return to the ranks. This program is intended to purify the officer corps of tendencies towards elitism and "bourgeois military thinking." By December 1962 it was claimed that over

771,000 army officers had served as privates in the ranks. [Gittings. 1967.] However, unexamined tradition is not an adequate justification for its continuation in the armed forces of today.

Second, the system has withstood the test of time, which may indicate the system is superior to alternate plans, but today's environment means a new "ball-game" and the "game" is not the same with different "rules."

Third, the system is necessary to maintain standards of authority and discipline, especially under combat conditions. In the days of muskets and close-order drill, this may have been true. Today often those being shot at are officers who have been ordered into combat by other officers, a system far removed from earlier days. This example applies to the majority of men who serve in the Air Force. Also the role of the non-commissioned officer is that of ordering and leading men into combat.

Available evidence casts considerable doubt on the value of military discipline as a factor relevant to combat motivation. The basic drive of self-preservation, the desire to return home safely, and mutual bonds with a buddy provide the soldier his main combat motivation.

A team of social scientists, headed by Samuel Stouffers, during World War II conducted a survey on combat motivation. When asked to select the factor "most important to you in

making you want to keep going," enlisted men identified leadership and discipline least of all the incentives listed. Only one per cent considered it their primary means of motivation. Compare this to the response given by officers when asked to name what they thought was most important to the troops. The officers considered discipline. It was selected most frequently by 19 per cent. [Stouffers, et. al., 1949.]

The Stouffer studies were confirmed by sociologist, Roger Little, who observed Army units in Korea. Little concluded that solidarity among small groups was the most important factor in explaining the behavior of enlisted men in combat. [Little, 1964.]

A study of Vietnam GIs by Charles Moskos [1969] saw combat troops being concerned only with their own personal survival. Studies such as the above indicate that strict military discipline need not contribute to combat effectiveness.

An account of the final reported mutiny in Vietnam can be used as an example of where traditional disciplinary methods were forsaken for a newer realistic approach.

The incident occurred at Phu Bai during the April 1972 Easter offensive. Troops of C Company, 2nd Battalion, 1st Infantry of the 196th Brigade were ordered to patrol enemy territory. About one hundred of the GIs refused, considering the mission too dangerous. The battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Mitchell, finally got the men to agree to advance. "The men were convinced not by threat of court-martial,

60

but by learning that their refusal would endanger A Company;
to protect their buddies, the soldiers reluctantly moved into
the field." [Cortright, 1975. p. 38.]

Fourth, once the separation between officers and enlisted
was based on functional differences. Differences in class,
education, skills, and experience once assisted a separation
process.

These areas of differentiation have gradually been eroded.
The only remaining requirement for officers is education.
Since the education gap is closing, as more and more young men
attend college, does the system remain valid? Examples can be
cited, especially during the draft, when in fact enlisted men
had formal education well above that of many of their fellow
officers.

With the advances made in technology, there is an increasing
need for the services to recruit persons with higher levels of
education, in order to maintain the complex weapon systems. A
solution to this problem is to give such qualified men a com-
mission. The disadvantage to such a program is that it only
serves to emphasize the two-class system. This requirement
for well educated enlisted personnel is a real problem as these
men and women would prefer service without the attached social
stigma of being enlisted personnel.

Fifth, the argument is often used that a two-class system is
needed in order to get competent people to join the armed forces.

Rewards and privileges of the officer class are used as motivational incentives. Reasons for the caste system were probably once valid. However, in today's environment, which is tending towards the recognition of a classless society, is such a system warranted?

B. MILITARY JUSTICE

Military discipline and training originated from times when mass armies had to face each other under fire in the open. Thus, a strict code of justice was required. With the passing of time, new technology has seen contingencies added to the law to such an extent that the Code of Military Justice has become a complex maze. The sorting out of this maze is a costly administrative burden, one which the services could well do without.

DoD has attempted to make reforms. The Navy, for example, now provides legal counsel to the accused at summary courts martial (courts martial tried by one officer). Where no counsel is available, there can be no judgment for prison terms, a fair and just reform, but a costly one.

Contentious areas of military justice still remain as recorded by Anthony De Stefano:

> "The so-called 'Devil's Article,' article 134 of the
> Code of Military Justice, is so named because it is
> vague, non-specific, and elastic enough to make many
> trivial offenses punishable by court martial. It is
> the closest thing in the military to 'Catch-22,' and,
> despite several attempts to have the article struck
> down as unconstitutional the courts have upheld the use
> of this part of the code."

[De Stefano, 1976. p. 562.]

Servicemen and women recruited from a society which is increasingly skeptical of authority and established institutions must eventually rebel against the arbitrary punitive methods of the military. The soldier no longer needs set direction, the new weapons systems require greater skills, abilities, and require individual initiative on the part of the operators.

A recommended alternative may be found in the study of the West Germany military law as pertaining to military discipline, March 15, 1957.

The Germans have made a serious attempt to incorporate humane principles into their penal code:

> "The regulation pertaining to military discipline
> [Military Law] is supposed to be not only an admini-
> strative order for the punishment of duty violations,
> but also is considered an educational means to be used
> to encourage the soldier to conscientiously fulfill
> his official duties and to prepare himself for the
> difficult employment his service must be expected to be
> in case of war. As a rule punishment should be used
> only after corrective instructions, admonition, and
> reprimand have failed to succeed. Educational means
> include not only reprimands and punishment, but also
> expressions of praise and appreciation."

[Waldman, 1964. p. 84.]

The German Military Penal Code is restricted purely to military violations; this is a conscious attempt to avoid different treatment of citizens with civilian or military status. Also, all legal proceedings against soldiers are handled by normal civil courts and not, as in most nations, by special military courts or war tribunals. This might appear an

excellent arrangement, but its implementation requires control.
Many cases in Germany have been drawn out to such an extent
that, for example, draftees have often received punishment for a
serious offense after finishing military service obligation.

The German example provides an alternative to the inadequate
U. S. system. An alternative worthy of further investigation
by U. S. military planners.

C. DEMOCRATIZATION

U.S. society today is very individualistic in nature and
enjoys the freedoms associated with a democratic society. The
youth of today demand individual treatment. If the armed forces
can not satisfy these two demands, then obtaining recruits will
be difficult for the armed forces.

The principle of military democracy was established at the
end of World War II. Western civilization, in an attempt to pre-
vent future re-occurrence of nazi war barbarities, adopted at
Nuremberg a code of individual moral responsibility by appeal-
ing to the basic ideals of humanity. Consequently, the soldier's
allegiance to the institution must not supersede his fundamental
obligation to the standards of law and morality.

The ultimate defense against militarism became the principle
of personal accountability. This principle guarantees soldiers
the right to question the functioning of the military to ensure
it has the support of the society from which it is drawn. This
principle has been adopted in writing by West Germany.

The Soldier's Law, the basic internal code of the Bundeswehr, is a system developed on the notion that the individual soldier must be given not only the right, but the responsibility, to think and act independently.

The Military Complaints Order details:

"The right and freedom [of the soldier] to complain belongs to the fundamental legal protections of the military service. Every soldier must have the right to appeal to a superior office to obtain protection from injustice suffered by him . . . No soldier may suffer any disadvantage because of the fact that he has complained."

[Waldman, 1964. p. 82.]

The Military Complaints Order is supported by the Law Pertaining to the Election of Soldier's Representatives. This law requires every small unit to elect a soldier to function as an intermediary between the soldiers and the unit commander. The unit commander must listen to the intermediary at any time and is not permitted to administer punishment or commendation until he has consulted the representative of the soldiers.

The reasoning behind this democratic procedure is that good obedience requires mutual confidence and respect between superior and subordinate. It also protects the soldier from orders which he believes are against his morals, either as a citizen or a soldier.

Other democratic processes have been used in other countries, such as the Service Ombudsman as employed in Norway, Australia, and Sweden, and the trade union as employed in the Netherlands and West Germany.

1. <u>Service Ombudsman</u>

The function of an ombudsman is normally to investigate individual grievances arising from the administration of an act, regulation, order or instruction which wholly or in part affects the rights of individuals. With a service ombudsman the individual can be either a member of the service, an ex-member, or eligible dependants. The service ombudsman will not normally investigate complaints related to the rights of persons as citizens.

a. Swedish Experience

Sweden pioneered the ombudsman system. The country has had a civil ombudsman since 1809. When World War I started, Sweden introduced conscription and increased her military budget. Public opinion demanded controls in these areas and as a result the Office of Ombudsman for military affairs was created in 1915. It was specifically stated that the Military Ombudsman (MO) should be a non-military personage to preserve the impartial nature of the office. In 1967 the office of the Civil and MO were combined.

The MO and a deputy are appointed by the Swedish Parliament for a four year term and they operate independently of both the executive and parliament. The MO receives no parliamentary direction and can decide himself which subjects he investigates and what action is necessary. However, he must submit an annual report to Parliament and this, together with

66

relevant documents, is subject to scrutiny by a parliamentary committee. The MO has no power to change an official decision, however he can prosecute for an indictable offence.

b. Australia's Defense Force Ombudsman (DFO)

Australia joined the ranks of countries with military ombudsman, when on 2 January 1975 the Minister for Defense appointed a DFO.

The jurisdiction of Australia's DFO is as follows:

"All members on continuous or part-time service, ex-members, and eligible dependants of ex-members of the Defense Force will be able to refer matters to the DFO which they believe infringe the rights they have accrued because of their service with the Defence Force."

[Report of the Defence Force Ombudsman for Period 25 December 1975 to 25 November 1976, 1976. Appendix A.]

Prior to the DFO, the soldier had the provision to seek a redress of wrongs through the chain of command, or the "de facto" system by addressing complaints direct to the Minister of Defense. Members using the chain of command system have frequently been frustrated by delays and lack of information, which reflected badly upon the efficiency of the system, and in some cases indicated an unfortunate lack of concern. Although the legal right to complain exists, there has been general reluctance to exercise that right for fear of reprisals. These factors resulted in a decline in the use of the redress system, and an increase in frequency in the use of the ministerial representations which, apart from the increased administrative

67

load involved, is indicative of a breakdown of the important chain of command principle.

The unique relationship between leader and led in a fighting force makes it imperative that the chain of command has the right to act on a complaint before the complaint is referred to a higher and external authority. The DFO Bill thus includes the requirement for a soldier to seek redress, first through the chain of command, and if he is not satisfied with the answer, or if after 28 days from seeking redress he is dissatisfied with the progress of his application, he may refer it to the DFO.

The biggest advantage of the DFO is that once a matter is accepted for inquiry, the DFO will conduct an independent and private investigation and will determine whether or not the substance of the complaint warrants some form of corrective action. If such action is required the DFO will refer the matter to the Minister and to the relevant area of the Defense Department where the required action can be taken.

The DFO could be likened to a union appeals system representing some employee's complaint against management, but with the advantage of being able to have access to management's records, action, and policies, etc. Impartiality and independence are the DFO's main advantage. Of prime concern to the enlisted personnel is that no disciplinary action can be taken against members who seek to correct a grievance through the DFO.

Another advantage of the ombudsman system is that all levels of military management are aware that their actions in treating a grievance have the possibility of being examined by the DFO should the soldier so choose. The chain of command system appears more concerned in processing any complaints or grievances than they did prior to the DFO.

The U. S. Army may consider that it has its own ombudsman in the Inspector General's Department and/or the Sergeant Major of the U. S. Army.

c.   Inspector General's Department of the U.S. Army

In 1813, the U. S. Army formed the Inspector General's Department; it is a staff organization and one of its many functions is to receive complaints of any kind from U. S. Army personnel and civilian employees.

All personnel are entitled to register grievances directly with an Inspector General (IG) officer instead of taking them up with their immediate superiors. After investigation of a grievance, the IG officer recommends action to the relevant commanding officer. If the complainant is not satisfied, he may appeal to an IG officer at a higher echelon. Studies indicate that it is not completely successful. Its function and effectiveness are treated with suspicion as it is a uniformed staff department and individuals fear reprisals, or are inhibited by rank structure from registering complaints. Probably as a result of this, the U. S. Chaplain's Department has acquired an unofficial function in handling grievances.

d. The Sergeant Major of the U. S. Army

The Sergeant Major of the U. S. Army is a personal advisor and assistant to the Army Chief of Staff on matters concerning enlisted men. In addition, he has some representational duties. He is able to present a point of view, but it is not necessarily that of the individual serviceman, nor has he any power to investigate individual complaints. He is not an ombudsman in its true sense.

The establishment of a service ombudsman is an attempt to provide the individual service member with a means whereby grievances can be aired. This is a fundamental right of individuals in a democratic society and hence should not be denied to service personnel. With a demand for civil liberties throughout society and with the current values and norms prevailing in civilian industry, a move toward military unions in the United States comes as no surprise.

2. Military Unionization

Union membership and military careerism have proved compatible in the military establishments of several Western European countries, notably Germany and Sweden. While unionization is alien to America's military, it is contagious.

The current interest in unionization stems from a number of sources.

First, the serviceman's dissatisfaction with his lot, his inability to influence his own destiny within an insensitive collective environment.

Second, the successful introduction of unions into the forces of NATO allies.

Third, the fact that union leaders have seen the dissent and discontent within the services and have offered union representation.

Fourth, the increase in union membership among other government type unions.

Fifth, the increase in the number of professions which are slowly turning towards unions as a means of obtaining better employment conditions.

Finally, the staunch opposition raised against military unionization, both by service and government leaders has had an opposite effect and has maintained the union issue "at the boil."

American commanders argue that unions would undermine military discipline and are unnecessary. This has not been the case with America's NATO allies.

a. Collective Bargaining within the Swedish Armed Forces

The Swedish armed forces union resulted from the 1965 "State Officials Act." This act "extended the private sector's collective bargaining rights over salaries and working conditions to nearly all national civil servants, including armed forces member." [Defense Manpower Commission: Organizing The Military Services Into a Union, 1975. Appendix II, p. 6.]

71

Unions exist for officers, noncommissioned officers, warrant officers, and draftees, each coordinating with each other and bargaining with civilian public employee unions to obtain improved pay and benefits.

The military unions may not strike or negotiate matters of selection, tenure and retirement.

Accomplishments of the unions have been:

* Increases in pay for lower-ranked officers, as high as 8%, per annum.

* Establishment of a 31-grade uniform salary scale for all Swedish national public employees, military and civilians.

* Marked increases in soldier morale.

[Defense Manpower Commission: Organizing the Military Services Into a Union, 1975.]

b.   Unionization in the Netherlands

In July 1966, an Association of Draftees (V.V.D.M.) was organized in an effort by draftees to protect their own interests. This effort was supported by the Dutch people, press, politicians, and a number of high-ranking officers. The union, which is run by seven draftees, has a membership of fifty per cent of the 45,000 conscripts within the Dutch armed forces. The method of bargaining used by the V.V.D.M. is termed institutionalized consultation, which is defined as organized discussion between government representatives and armed forces personnel on matters of mutual concern prior to any governmental decision implementation in the field of military personnel.

72

Armed forces elected representatives are sent to a monthly committee meeting where personnel matters are openly discussed and considered by Defense Ministry officials.

The consultation has the following accomplishments to its credit:

* Establishment of new billeting (housing) standards, including modernization of barracks and mess halls.

* Allowance for the wearing of civilian clothes when off duty.

* Abolishment of so-called military trains which were mandatory for off-duty travel previously.

* Abolishment of close detention, length of hair, and the number of inspections.

* Introduction of free reveille procedures.

* An increase in pay to the level of the minimum youth wages for a person of 20 years of age.

Like the Swedish union, the Dutch also are not allowed to strike. Compared to other NATO soldiers, the Dutch soldier may appear to be slovenly in appearance, but his competence and dedication are unquestionable.

c. The Federal Republic of Germany: A Quasi-Union

Military personnel in West Germany are represented by the German Armed Forces Association (DBVB). The DBVB is much like a professional association, since military unions are not permitted. Members of the association elect representatives who lobby within the Defense Ministry and the West

German legislature for favorable legislation concerning service conditions, pay and allowances.

The West German system represents a compromise between Sweden's genuine collective bargaining union and the institutionalized consultation procedures of the Dutch. The German soldier not only has the DBVB, but he can also belong to a non-military trade union.

One of the popular unions joined by military personnel is the Transport and Traffic Trade Union (OTV). This union consists mainly of public employees who negotiate annually with the Federal Minister of Interior for better conditions. Since civilian and military salaries are derived from the same schedule, benefits gained by the OTV assist the military, also the military supplements the OTV by the lobby pressures applied by the DBVB.

"The Federal Republic's mixed military association labor union works well and compromises neither discipline nor preparedness." [Defense Manpower Commission: Organizing the Military Services Into a Union, 1975. p. 10.]

Discontent in the U.S. armed forces is a result of the peacetime environment and the economic situation, which have tended to erode benefits programs considered part of the serviceman's contract.

In order to try and reduce the high percentage of the budget allocated to personnel, "scuttlebutt" about reduced pensions, phasing out of subsidies for the operating costs of

commissaries over a three-year period, reduced family health care (CHAMPUS), and restraint in the growth of compensation levels, all become extremely important to the soldier and his family.

This, together with the staunch opposition directed towards unionization by political and military leaders, is in the author's opinion only creating a situation in which unionization of the armed forces will flourish.

A fundamental premise of military service is that the military commander bears the ultimate responsibility for his men. He must be given the maximum discretion to accomplish his mission. This premise must not be overridden if unions are allowed into the U. S. services. The authority of the military commander remains paramount in the three alternatives outlined, and the same authority must exist if effective unionization is to occur in the U. S. forces.

The next step for unionization within the U.S. forces is for political and military leaders to face the situation realistically, accept that unionization will eventually succeed, and plan so that the successful union is designed in accordance with DoD requirements.

The advantages and disadvantages of military unionization have been left for the reader to judge for himself. One area yet to be researched is if military unions become operational what would be their effect on recruiting? Young men considering a service career may often be put off from joining

because of the impersonal nature of the military system. This perception could change if he knew at least a union existed to which he could take his troubles.

This section on democratization of the service has been an attempt on the author's part to cover the number of different types of alternatives available to defense planners, so that they may design a method acceptable to society, so that the individualistic nature of soldiers are taken into account.

D. SPECIALIST SYNDROME

Society is increasingly complex. Therefore, people must increasingly specialize to serve society much the same way nations specialize and participate in international trade. Today's armed forces, because of technology changes, have a requirement for an increasing number of specialists. Yet in most services officers are essentially generalists. The system is not dissimilar to that of the old landed gentry, when the young sons were instructed to be gentlemen first, and then, how to make a living. Today graduating officers from all the various commissioning agencies are told you must be an officer and gentleman first, and then, and only then, can you specialize in say transport, flying or supply.

A young man studies in college and in many cases at the various military academies to be a physicist, an economist, and so forth. The services then send him out to work in an unrelated field, surely an inefficient method of manpower utilization.

A man should be known as an "electrical engineer" first then as an "officer." Such a procedure would provide links between professional groups. Prestige accruing to the individual as an electrical engineer officer may indirectly enhance the prestige of the military, and the military in general would have stronger links with a wider range of civilian professional groups. A continual update of technology in the professional field would flow into the military at little cost. [Rosser, 1973.]

Morris Janowitz [1972], in recommending changes needed for the transition to the all-volunteer force, noted a similar need. He proposed that the three-step system of in-service professional schools be consolidated. The continuation of the current system he deemed to be "wasteful, often mechanical and repetitious, as well as time-consuming." He does not deny that military officers require extensive education, but perhaps a two-tier system would suffice?

Janowitz also recommends that the military academy programs should permit one year attendance at a civilian university, although his reasoning for so doing is not stated. Such a procedure would provide a benefit that the draft provided, that is it would help discourage a separate military ethos which could constitute a political threat. Exposure to the freedom and ideals from a civilian university could help to provide a more balanced outlook.

E.   THE HAIRCUT ANACHRONISM

It may seem like a trite issue, but to enlisted military
personnel the standards of haircuts are a big issue of pro-
test. Society has accepted the new standards, so why not the
military?

Congressman Edward Hebert, Chairman of the House of Repre-
sentatives Armed Services Committee, suggests that any relaxa-
tion of restrictions in the military about haircuts is tending
to turn the armed forces into a permissive and democratic
country club. [Rosser, 1973.]

It must be agreed that for certain jobs, restrictions on
hair length must apply for health or safety reasons, just as it
does within the civilian community.

It is about time the services considered Admiral Zumwalt's
remarks:

> ". . . . I have yet to be shown how neatly trimmed beards
> and sideburns or neatly shaped afro haircuts contribute to
> military delinquency, or detract from a ship's ability
> to carry out its combat function."

[Mulliken, 1970. p. 21.]

There are a number of convincing testimonies supporting
Zumwalt from women and from European soldiers, who are allowed
long hair, claiming that hair length is not a deciding factor
in military efficiency.

F. ATTITUDES TO SERVICE INCENTIVES

The services have a requirement to develop better admini-
strative techniques to foster the appeal of a service career
by competent personnel. The choice of a strategy by which to
influence career motivation within the services has assumed
increasing importance in the all-volunteer environment. Despite
the urgent need, however, the optimum strategy is not immediately
apparent.

1. Incentives as a Change Mechanism

The logic of incentives as a change mechanism starts with
the simple paradigm that if you offer people the opportunity to
gain specific objects or objectives which they value, they will
change their behavior in order to realize these values and then
adjust their behavior in order to maintain these values. In
using this approach, however, the implicit assumptions outlined
in the following paragraphs have often been overlooked. Yet,
they are crucial in both the design and utilization of incen-
tive change methods.

An important assumption underlying the incentive inter-
vention approach is that "more is better" such that when greater
societal value is attached to particular incentives, such in-
centives are assumed to be more effective. The manpower pro-
jections developed by the Gates Commission assumed this to be
true. In the Commission Report, it was estimated that a 10%

increase in basic military pay would result in a 12.5% increase
in the enlistment rate, while a 40% pay raise would bring about
a 49% increase in the number of voluntary enlistees. [Presi-
dent's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 1970.]

Another assumption is that the incentives which are
being manipulated actually represent appreciable values and con-
stitute a source of attraction to the target population in-
volved. To the extent that they are not obviously, the ap-
proach loses effectiveness. Clearly the services, with their
great diversity of individuals with a wide variety of needs
and motives, presents a problem in trying to use any single
incentive strategy effectively.

Much in the same way unions have little opposition to
young men joining a union on starting their first job. Under
the conditions of an all-volunteer service program, the success
of the program depends on the incentives offered by the services
and the perception of these incentives by society. Both the
incentives offered must align to what is wanted.

Frey et. al., [1973] in their extensive research program
into incentives within the Navy, present a number of enlighten-
ing facts.

The purpose of the research was to administer a set of
experimental incentives to a random sample of male youth in the
age ranges 16-22 years in order to ascertain their potential
worth for inducing enlistment into the Navy. One of the ap-
proaches to test if "more is better" was to check whether

increases in the absolute magnitude of single incentives would enhance the attractiveness of the Navy.

Differences in the value of an enlistment bonus were presented since enlistment and re-enlistment bonuses have a long history of popularity and use. Thus, the attractiveness of a $1,000 enlistment bonus was compared with the attractiveness of a $3,000 enlistment bonus for the same length of engagement period. Surprisingly, contrary to popular opinion, the $1,000 bonus was marginally more attractive than the $3,000 bonus. The results must tentatively suggest that "more is sometimes worse." [Frey et. al., 1973.]

Although one may at first feel that the above results are contrary to common sense a number of psychological theories provide possible explanations.

Increasing the absolute magnitude of certain incentives may lead one to the conclusion that the Navy is so unattractive that it must resort to bribes to ensure enlistment.

The dominant philosophy of motivation currently used by service managers is the carrot-and-stick philosophy, reward and punishment. If one were to ask these same managers to close their eyes for a moment and to form a picture in their mind of an image with a carrot at one end and a stick at the other, then ask them to describe the central image in that picture, most frequently they would respond that the central figure was a jackass. Thus the unconscious assumption behind the reward-punishment model is that one is dealing with jackasses. Today's

81

youth are far from being jackasses, they realize there is no such thing as a "free lunch." [Levinson, 1973.]

A second possible explanation is that these increased incentives may be perceived as grossly manipulative. If this were the case, their feelings could harbor resentment, and thus prevent a person from enlisting.

2. Is Money The Answer?

Money is supposed to be the main reason, if not the only one, that most people have for working at all .   Gellerman states:

"To be effective the net gain must be large enough to assure the individual of some degree of safety. Precisely because an increment has to be big to be effective, it is likely to encounter skepticism."

[Gellerman, 1968. p. 278.]

The Gates Commission recommended pay raise was large and pay for military recruits increased 193 per cent above inflation between 1964 and 1973, however their recommendation suffered from two other money misconceptions. [Towell, 1977.]

Firstly, managers think money is a prime motivator because they themselves are highly achievement-oriented and attach special significance to money rewards. Military men and top executives tend to be achievement-oriented and because they themselves are particularly interested in some concrete measure that will reflect how well they have done, it is easy and natural for them that the same will apply for all. [McClelland, 1967.]

82

Secondly, managers have a tendency to keep coming back to money as a means of motivating people because at the practical level it is one thing that can be easily manipulated.

From the above, if money is not the prime motivator for enlistment into the services, what is?

In 1969 Bachman and Johnston asked 2,213 male respondents how attractive they would find each of 11 different incentives assuming that the Vietnam War had ended and the draft had been eliminated. One incentive stood out above the others: the Government agrees to pay for up to four years college in return for four years active duty. This alternative was chosen by a four to one majority. In 1970 the same questions were asked of a sample of 1,273 with the same 25 per cent majority. [Bachman and Johnston, 1972.]

During the period April 1971 to April 1972, a questionnaire was administered to all male enlistees at twenty-five Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Stations. The total sample consisted of 26,853 voluntary accessions to the enlisted force. The first twelve questions requested respondents to rank each of twelve reasons that may have influenced them to join the services on a scale of either strong influence, some influence or no influence. The most frequently endorsed reason for enlistment was to learn a trade or skill valuable in civilian life. Between 59% and 65% of the total sample attributed strong influence to this reason in each month. [Fisher and Harford, 1973.]

The above research programs have indicated that money is not the main motivator of persons intending to join the armed services. If this then is the case, what action should the Government now take?

During May 1973, a nationwide sample of youth, ages 14 to 22, were stratified within geographic region according to age and school status. A sample of 860 males aged between 16 - 22 were requested to assess a set of experimental incentives in order to ascertain their potential fruitfulness for inducing enlistment in the Navy. An effort was made in the assessment to compare the potential effectiveness of these incentives when they were presented individually and when presented in combination with each other. In December 1973, the five most attractive incentives from the above experiment with ten new incentives were administered to a national sample of 854 civilian males aged 16 - 22 years. The consistency of results from both iterations enabled the following conclusions:

1. Increasing the number of different enlistment incentives does not increase the attraction of a career -- double or even triple incentives packages are no better than single incentives.

2. A tangible incentive has a critical point beyond which increasing its absolute value has no effect. In some cases an increase in absolute value of a tangible incentive may even decrease the attraction of enlistment.

3. Different incentives attract different demographic groups.

4. The opportunity to exercise a greater degree of fate control in one's vocation represents an influence that is equal to or stronger than the appeal of traditional tangible incentives.

Recruiting strategies based primarily upon the "economic man" model must be considered highly suspect. The Government needs to pursue the above experiments in order to obtain an optimum incentive strategy. [American Institute for Research, 1974.]

Enlistment in today's volunteer armed services connotates a controlled environment. Members enlisting perceive that their fate is controlled by the powers to be. The services have taken it for granted that the exigencies of military service leave little room for modification of current organizational practices to alter the image in terms of more flexible decision-making initiative-taking and individual participation. Serious consideration must be given to experimenting with organizational changes that provide a psychological climate that offers men a larger measure of personal fate control in their vocational life.

Civilians while working have the option of giving "notice" and then leaving. This too may ensure that they have a certain amount of freedom. It disperses the fear of a controlled environment. It is recommended that the services research the implications of having a three-month trial enlistment, after which time the individual is free to seek employment elsewhere.

Immediate reaction to such a proposal is that it would be too costly. To counter this argument, one can quote "quality is superior to quantity." Also, the military tends to oppose experimentation. It wants complete commitment, or nothing.

With the appropriate safeguards to protect its interests, there does not seem to be any way the services could lose, employing such a scheme.

Initial enlistment would probably increase, as it would appear much easier to make a small decision (three months) rather than a long-term one (three to six years). To a young man, six years appears to be the rest of his youth.

Today patriotism, compulsion, financial benefits, job training opportunities, and the promise of adventure are no longer successful in motivating young men to enlist, re-enlist, fight, and risk their lives in the armed forces.

Military managers must locate and develop those traditional incentives to which the youth of today are still responsive, yet also give serious consideration to developing new incentives which provide a psychological climate that offers service members a larger measure of control over their vocation.

G. FORCE EFFECTIVENESS

It is important that when considering all the alternatives offered in this chapter that one does not lose sight of the fact that the armed forces have a vital mission and that any changes adopted must not impinge upon their operational effectiveness.

It is the author's contention that none of the changes high-
lighted would lessen operational effectiveness.

The military can proceed using its old methods, but without
change there must be doubt as to whether it can develop an ef-
fective military force, that is compatible with the rest of
American society. A military force that is unlike the society
it serves is not effective. The Vietnam conflict brought home
this expensive lesson.

The following quote provides a fitting closure to this
chapter:

> "The coming generation of military leaders therefore
> should examine objectively the issues with respect to
> the relationship of the military to society, and discard
> dogma which cannot withstand the test of operational
> effectiveness. The military has been spared this task
> for 20 years because of the cold war and a resulting
> manpower draft. But the luxury of a guaranteed supply
> of men and a sympathetic public has about run its course."

[Rosser, 1973. p. 175.]

The U. S. military has accepted the social pressures and
instituted an all-volunteer armed force, yet they must maintain
a force size comparable with national security and foreign
policy missions. The current system is failing to provide the
necessary recruits. Is this "checkmate?" A system which may
provide a workable solution is the British Regimental Struc-
tured armed force.

V. THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

The British Army currently operates on a regimental system
of organization, as does the Australian Army. The success of
the regimental system in Australia is limited; this is not the
fault of the system, but rather the fact that the Australian
Army has too few persons to gain the full benefits of such an
organizational structure.

The regimental system has been applied only to armies;
however, such a concept can be adopted for the Navy or an Air
Force. For the Navy, a home port or fleet concept could apply,
while a home base could be used as an Air Force equivalent.

A. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

The term regiment has been defined in Webster's dictionary
as "a body of soldiers commanded by a colonel and consisting of
a number of companies, troops, or batteries." The term appears
throughout history in almost every army of the world.

It is important to realize that the term is used in a dif-
ferent sense from that which is often used in the U. S. Army.
The British regiment is not a combat unit. The term regiment
refers to a group of associated infantry battalions with a
common title, common interests, and in many cases recruited
from the same geographical area. The U. S. regiment is a com-
bat unit composed of three battalions and supporting arms. The
British equivalent to this U. S. regiment is a "brigade," while
the Australian equivalent is a "task force."

88

The regiment was never designed to be a tactical unit, it evolved for purposes of administration, discipline, and instructions for a number of subordinate units. Its formation provided its member units with a central supply system as well as a replacement depot system that would permit subordinate units to maneuver and fight more effectively. [Mayew, 1976.]

Each regiment consists of a number of fighting battalions. Historically, in peacetime a British army regiment normally had two battalions, one at home and one overseas. When mobilization occurred, the number of battalions were greatly increased.

All the affairs of the regiment are run by the Depot and Regimental Headquarters. This co-ordinating unit is commanded by a lieutenant colonel and he is responsible purely for regimental matters, such as recruiting, induction, demobilization, individual and regimental records, regimental customs and procedures. [Paget, 1954.]

Each regiment has a "Colonel of the Regiment." He is normally the senior retired officer of the regiment and is given this honorary title together with the responsibility of watching over the regiment's interests. He represents the regiment at official and unofficial occasions, lays down the policy on all domestic matters, as well as selecting candidates for commissions.

In the U.S., patriotism, compulsion, financial benefits, and the promise of adventure have been the motivations emphasized in encouraging recruits into the armed forces. However, in the

Roman Legions heavy reliance was placed upon the motivation of unit pride, membership or esprit de corps. It is this heavy reliance upon morale that provides the base for the British regiment.

An officer or soldier in the British Army can serve throughout his military career belonging to the same regiment. Even if for career necessity the soldier has to go to other duties or units, he still remains part of the regiment and will return to the regiment after the necessary assignments.

By using this technique the regiment creates a group small enough for loyalties and traditions to be built up to an extent which is impossible in larger and more impersonal units. Each regiment has a name, a standard, distinguishing badges, special customs, rituals and traditions, together with a long and honorable history.

B. HISTORY OF THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

The precise date of the organization of the first regiment is difficult to determine. British historians claim the first date as being 1421, when the Scotsmen-at-arms entered the service of France as archers. Germany claims 1478 with the establishment of their mercenary bands. Although it is difficult to establish the first date, by the end of the thirteenth century six different countries, France, Switzerland, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and England had military forces organized on a regimental structure. [Hollister, 1965.]

Until the 19th century Britain's Army was not a full-time army organization, but rather an organization of separate regiments. During war the battalions were brought together to form tactical units called brigades. Each regiment was self supporting, providing arms and ammunition while the soldier provided all the other essentials such as uniforms and clothing.

The regimental system over this time period tended to be corrupt. However, it was basically a good system for its time; it provided little cost to the country. The system was tested and forged by frequent wars. It was a system that people knew, it was capable of operating for regulars or militia, and it was a system supported by more than a century of military history and tradition.

It is because of this strong tradition that the British regimental system has survived with little modification to the present day.

1. Use of the Regiment in America

The first day of the landings at Jamestown in 1607 the settlers accepted a militia obligation. By 1623 it became a statutory requirement to bear arms and muster for military duty when called.

"In 1636 the General Court of Massachusetts Bay organized Massachusetts companies into the colonies first regiments, the North, East, and Boston regiments." [Mayew, 1976. p. 15.]

April 1756 saw Major General Edward Braddock appointed as Commander-in-Chief of all the military forces in North

America. His two Irish Infantry regiments were joined by two locally recruited regiments in June of the same year. By fall 1756, a new regiment designated the Royal Americans, or the 60th Regiment, joined the other four regiments. [Weigley, 1967.] This system of local recruiting for British Regiments soon ceased and the British forces were reinforced direct from England.

On June 30, 1775, the Continental Congress adopted, with a few modifications, the British Articles of War for governing the initial authorization of troops. The American Army of 1775 had thirty-eight regiments. [Mayew, 1976.] General Washington organized these regiments into brigades of six regiments each, with two brigades forming a division.

Continental regiments received their support entirely from their home states. Each state determined the equipment for its regiments, thus each regiment had a different size and different standards of equipment and training.

In 1784, Congress reorganized the Army into a single regiment of approximately 700 men, their mission being to provide troops to man the former British frontier garrisons. Congress provided each State a quota of manpower requirements.

The deterioration of Indian relations necessitated a reorganization of the Army into the Legions of the United States in 1792. This reorganization saw an increase in authorized strength to 774 officers and 9,147 enlisted men. [Mayew, 1976.]

After the war of 1812, the Army underwent a further reorganization. These continual reorganizations provided no chance for lineage to be established or continued. What few traditions and esprit de corps the regiments did have was lost in the maze of so numerous reorganizations.

1821 saw the reduction of the regular army to 5,586 enlisted men. This force retained its regimental structure during the successful Mexican War up to the Civil War.

The organization of the army for the Civil War included nineteen regiments of infantry, six regiments of cavalry, and five regiments of artillery, with a maximum strength of 44,893 officers and men. [Mayew, 1976.] However, the tactical deployment of regiments as regiments was incorrect as the regiments were too large.

During the course of the Civil War, the Northern Army organized approximately 1,700 infantry regiments, 272 cavalry regiments, and 78 regiments of artillery. The Confederacy organized approximately 572 infantry regiments, 150 regiments of cavalry and 300 batteries of artillery. [Mayew, 1976.]

The years 1869 to 1950 saw a number of reorganizations. This period saw the beginning of the end of the regiments as part of the army structure. The experiences of the Spanish American War made it apparent that the best organization for an army was that which serves both the tactical and administrative needs.

On June 3, 1916, Congress approved the National Defense Act, which provided for the establishment of tactical divisions in a peacetime environment. This, together with the replacement method of man for man used by the American Expeditionary Forces in World War I, provided for little regimental continuity.

World War II saw the return of the regimental structure especially for specialized soldiers such as mountain troops. The regimental structure in 1956 was limited to fifty-four infantry regiments and four armored cavalry regiments on active duty.

The pentomic organization evolved in the mid-1950's. This organization was based on five subordinate units with a nuclear capability. This new organization eliminated any semblance of the old three regimental structure and regimental commands.

The introduction of the Combat Arms Regimental System (CARS) in 1957 saw an attempt by the army to retain the histories and traditions of all its regiments. CARS has had minor success in perpetuating the honors and histories of the various regiments, but the fifth phase, to provide a home for the regimental headquarters and a home for all members of the various regiments, has yet to be implemented. Until phase five of CARS has been implemented, benefits associated with a regimental system based on the British concept will not be forthcoming to the American forces.

The 1964 army reorganization under Reorganization Objective Army Division (ROAD) eliminated all but five armored cavalry regiments from the active army organization.

A review of the general history of the regimental concept and its role in the U. S. Army is essential to show that such an organization structure is not new to the United States. But the full benefits to be gained from such a system, lineage and esprit de corps has been hampered by reorganizations legislation.

> "Some sinister effort must have been at work to deprive all the old regiments of their traditions and spirit. For no plan could have more shrewdly damned any existing pride and affiliations than the way the Army was diabolically jumbled."

[Ganoe, 1964. p. 32.]

This quote from Major Ganoe's "the History of the United States Army" dealing with the 1815 reorganization, indicates the reason for the lack of tradition associated with U. S. forces when compared to British forces.

C. WHY THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM?

1. Esprit De Corps

Pride and loyalty in one's unit is a very real asset, especially in time of war. During the Korean War, the death rate among allied prisoners of war due to sickness and malnutrition was remarkably low among the British prisoners. "Doctors attributed this largely to the regimental system, because it built up a unit pride and loyalty among the men."
[Paget, 1954. p. 32.] Men from the same regiments helped

95

members of their regiment who were in trouble. Morale and the determination to live were raised as these men were determined not to let the regiment down by displaying weak or dishonorable behavior.

Military effectiveness is strongly influenced by leadership, but in the last analysis effectiveness depends on the fighting spirit of the individual servcieman. One of the most important elements that contributes to this fighting spirit is esprit de corps or unit pride. Major General Blakeley writing in 1955 quotes a National Guard general as saying: "We will never win the next war with those faceless things that GIs call 'bodies' - we must have units that know their traditions and *will die for them*." It is agreed Vietnam was not a declared war, but the quote is worthy of note, when one considers the Vietnam experience.

Is tradition or esprit de corps worth anything to a unit? Some officers will contend that without exprit de corps the combat unit is of little value, while others will disagree. Brigadier General Paul M. Robinett, USA, Retired, who has commanded both a regiment and a combat command, notes that a unit with a long record of achievements is worth twenty-five per cent more than one with no tradition. Since it is difficult to measure the worth of tradition to a unit, it is not possible to say a unit will win battles by five or ten per cent. If it can help, is it not worthwhile? [Fisher, 1955.]

96

Adoption of the regimental system based on the advantage of an esprit de corps of such a system people may claim is obsolete in the twentieth century. Contemporary man is too skeptical, rational, to be influenced by a system based on tradition. One may argue against this, the continued success of the regimental system of the British Army, not to mention the very high morale of elite units in the United States, such as the "Green Berets." The return of an esprit de corps must be considered a major advantage to the introduction of a regimental system to the U, S. military.

The knowledge of belonging to a regiment gives a person a sense of security among the many uncertainties of military life. The soldier needs to feel that he is a member of a family. This feeling is especially true in time of peace due to the lack of national interest in the armed forces. It is also especially true if the individual happens to join the service from a broken home.

The need to affiliate, or to be with others, is an exceedingly strong one in some individuals. Schachter once placed five students in five separate rooms in which they had no contact with the outside world. Each of the volunteer students was given a considerable sum of money for each day they remained in the sterile environment. By the second day, only one student remained; he lasted until the eighth day. Although not a well-controlled experiment, it does indicate the need for affiliation and the effects of social isolation. [Wrightsman, 1972.]

Once recruited direct into a regiment, the member soon knows that he can always turn to his regiment for help, and that he is always known there personally, and that he is important to the regiment. This sense of belonging provides other advantages:

1. The soldier is made conscious of his being part of a community which has certain standards. The community has a reputation to uphold. The community also has a life which will survive the life of any of its members.

2. The recognition of being part of a community puts social pressure on the soldier to want to conform to its standards, rather than pure discipline and or relatively abstract patriotism.

3. The existence of the unit as a community, and because of slow turnover its members establish long friendships. Everyone knows everyone well; strengths and weaknesses of each individual are known and they may be employed for the benefit of the whole. This is especially useful to commanders in the field as they know their men and thus are not in the hands of computer printouts.

4. Soldiers will develop strong links and ties with the community, thus making his early resignation all the more difficult.

Thus, in terms of a volunteer military, the regimental system is particularly attractive, because it offers the member a life in the armed forces, rather than just a career.

98

2. Administration Decentralization

The regimental system makes it possible to decentralize some of the administration of individuals and his welfare. In so doing this then develops a more personal contact than when careers are handled centrally.

Recommendations for promotions are made from within the regiment, hence these recommendations are based on personal knowledge, and as such must be considered superior to that which may be contained in records and reports.

Recruiting for each regiment could be geographically based. Each regiment would be responsible for its own training standards. This being the case, the regiments would have flexibility in establishing their own recruiting standards. Each regiment would know the jobs that were vacant, the urgency required in filling the positions and the minimum standard required to occupy the position. Thus a regimental commander may be willing to accept a lower standard in order to ensure that a necessary task is performed. The current system of centralized recruiting procedures allows no flexibility of standards.

3. Cost Center Utilization

With the amount of money allocated each year for defense becoming smaller in relation to the whole, then it becomes the responsibility of the military forces to ensure that the resource is not wasted. A system for measuring commander's efficiency, while at the same time ensuring maximum budgetary control is to employ each regiment as a cost center. Each

regiment could be given a recruiting and training budget. The standard of the regiment must be maintained at a certain minimum acceptable level. Regimental commanders achieving these standards at least cost should be recognized.

Utilization of a regiment as a defined cost center has certain attractive benefits and should lead to lower costs, especially in manpower procurement in the future.

4. "Up or Out"

Policies such as "up or out" must be re-examined by military planners. The present system of promotion and rewards places premium on calendar methods instead of proven human performance and capabilities. Members not wanting supervisory roles are forced out, even though they may be competent technicians. It must be acknowledged that not all members joining the forces will reach the pinnacle of success, i.e. general or admiral. It is also recognized that the Peter Principle generally prevails in the military environment, that is, man raises to the level of his incompetence. Since not everyone can be a general, why dismiss those persons who have accepted their level of competence.

Currently the armed forces incur substantial costs as a result of the inadequacy of information available about the value of its human resources. During the past few years, human resources accounting has become prominent. Human resource accounting involves measuring the costs incurred by an organization

to recruit, select, hire, train, and develop human assets. It also involves measuring the economic value of people to the services. In an unpublished paper, Bill Carter attempts to value the Navy pilot by using training costs incurred as a surrogate measure. By establishing an individual's future worth to the organization, an estimated loss of $307,421 (1976 prices) must be written off by the Navy if they fail to promote the pilot after his eleventh year of a planned twenty-five year career. After eleven years service and after being passed over for promotion, the pilot has little alternative but to retire. With individual worth established in dollar terms, the "up or out" philosophy must be challenged. [Carter, 1977.]

A regimental system would have the advantage that it would be able to employ those persons in certain positions for as long as the person was contented to remain depending on age restrictions.

5. Reserve Military Forces

A strong reserve force is crucial to the success of an all-volunteer force. In early February 1977, the Army Chief of Staff, General Bernard Rogers, warned the Armed Services Committee of the plight of the reserves. The reserves are experiencing a serious decline in strength due to the lack of draft-motivated enlistments. [Towell, 1977.]

If a regimental structured force was established in an area, it could consist of both regular and reserve forces. Thus, an intimate liaison is set up increasing the efficiency of both, in peace and war. Both forces can train together; this is

101

especially beneficial to the reserves as they get to use and train on the latest weapons. They can not under the current system.

A little rivalry properly controlled between active and reserve forces is a great incentive to achievement in peace as well as in war. The regimental system encourages just this competitive spirit. A true example of this spirit comes from the famous charge of the Light Brigade at Balaklava during the Crimean War. A blunder in orders caused 800 British cavalry to charge the Russian guns. A charge which meant almost certain death. "As they raced at a gallop into the Valley of Death, a trooper of the 13th Light Dragoons was heard to shout, "Come on, Don't let those - - - of the Seventeenth [Lancers] get in front of us." [Paget, 1954, p. 32.] On the other hand, extreme competition whereby regiments act only in their own interest and not in the common interest of the service could jeopardize missions.

A combination of reserve and active units in the one location may supply the needed incentive to increase reserve recruitment. The reserve force will be able to identify and train with active duty forces thus dispelling the notion that they are merely "weekend warriors playing soldiers."

6. Command and Control

The regimental concept of organization, where a number of battalions are grouped under a regimental headquarters, has two important command advantages over the current combat command concept.

102

The first is responsibility. Man will continue to be an important factor in war, whether it be nuclear, conventional, or guerrilla. Hence, his behavior and the means of controlling his actions are not to be treated lightly. The battalion commander within a regimental organization is always responsible, directly to the regimental commander for all his actions, whether operating as a regimental unit or attached to another unit. Such a close chain of responsibility is not to be found within the combat command structure. Because a battalion can move from one combat command to another, and if the battalion is not performing up to standard, there is a tendency for the combat command commander to tolerate such performance, since the battalion is not an organic portion of his command. In this case, the combat commander may be tempted to blame battle failure on the fact that he was not responsible for the training of the battalions assigned to him.

The regimental commander, on the other hand, can and expects to be held responsible at all times for the behavior of all his units, whether they be attached or organic to the regiment. Even when operating detached from their own regiment, the battalion commander will continue to work hard to impress his own regimental commander. [Fisher, 1955.]

The principle of span of control should probably be considered with responsibility. It is agreed that there is a limit to the number of subordinates which anyone person can effectively supervise and control. The exact number is different depending

103

on the situation. The control span ranges from five to about
seven subordinates. The combat command concept with the large
number of subordinates reporting directly to the division commander
violates this principle. The regimental commander on the other
hand has the advantage in assisting the division commander in
his responsibilities on a continuous basis.

7. Rotation Policy.

The current U. S. world-wide personnel system which
leads to continuous, excessive, expensive, and disruptive rota-
tion can no longer be justified in today's environment. The
rationale for this antiquated system is that it prevents stag-
nation and trains personnel for high command. Training would
be the responsibility of the regimental commander and a unit
replacement system would be used rather than individual replace-
ment. Individual replacement has become outmoded, because it
weakens military cohesion. Individual replacement causes
family discontent which leads to resignations and failure to
re-enlist.

Hanson W. Baldwin, military editor of "The New York
Times," summed up the rotational situation this way in a
"Saturday Evening Post" article:

> "Today, rotation and turnover, and the Army's replace-
> ment system have made the fine old regiments - Custer's
> 7th Cavalry ... the 38th [Infantry], the 9th, and the
> rest - merely numbers on the roster; not living, breath-
> ing parts of a continuing tradition.

"The services must at all costs build up unit esprit de corps ... A Service "home", less rotation, less career guidance, less emphasis on individual schooling and training, more unit integrity and cohesiveness - these are the needs."

[Blakely, 1955. p. 3.]

If a regimental organization structure was developed for the U. S. services, it would require that the regiment would have an established "home base" from which all rotational tours would begin and to which the regiment would return. Such a system would benefit the soldier, his family, and the general society.

The soldier would know where to buy a house, his family can integrate with the local community, join various clubs, etc. If the regiment moves overseas, then his family has the support and friendship of other regimental families as well as the local community.

The local community tends to adopt a regiment which is located in their area. They claim the regiment as their own and feel as proud of it as the men who are in it. Thus local civilians do their share towards helping the regiment, they do not want to let down their local regiment. During war, the collection of "home comforts" to be sent to their regiment is much easier to collect for than for the services as a whole.

Thus there is a need by military planners to investigate and appraise the regimental system and its possible adoption for the U. S. military forces. There are of course drawbacks to the regimental system.

105

D. DISADVANTAGES TO THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

The major disadvantage to the employment of a regimental system is that it complicates personnel procedures. The army loses flexibility as it foregoes the ability to transfer at will personnel required to meet the needs of the entire army. It also becomes very difficult to correct poor management at higher levels. The ability to transfer top managers, who are not members of the regiment into a regiment is difficult.

One disadvantage which is sometimes cited against the regimental system is that unit emphasis would lead to an uneven quality of units. This is probably correct, although the institution of service-wide requirements of training and performance for all units could be used to minimize this effect.

It is argued that a regimental system with its regimental headquarters, badges, and ceremonial appurtenance necessary to create a unit identity is expensive. These costs, however, are likely to be small in comparison to the savings in rotation expenses. Any necessary collective facilities such as officers' and NCO's messes could be paid for by the regiments from their own pockets, as such facilities would be permanent. Under the current system transients are not motivated to invest in permanent facilities for which they will gain little benefit.

Another disadvantage cited is that the regimental system increases the risk of one particular area suffering unduly if its units have heavy casualties. This possibility can not be

denied, but the risk can be minimized if units are not too large. Also all units are not likely to be in battle together. In any case, the risk should be accepted as one of the inevitable risks of war. The nuclear weapons of today place whole cities under the same danger.

With the advantages outweighing the above disadvantages, how would a proposed regimental system be implemented into the existing U. S. armed forces?

E. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE REGIMENTAL SYSTEM

The British regimental system is partly organized on a geographical basis with the counties often having their own regiments of one or more battalions named after them. Each regiment consists of at least one or two active duty battalions, together with one or two reserve battalions. On war being declared, the reserves are mobilized from within the various regiments.

The tremendous state pride that exists within the United States provides a ready base for the adoption of the regimental system along British lines. At many of the established military bases a regimental headquarters could be established. The tactical organization that currently exists could remain and be allocated to a regimental headquarters. Reserve units could also be allocated to a regimental headquarters.

The United States could then be divided into numerous recruiting areas. Each regiment would be assigned one of these

recruiting areas. Regiments would recruit exclusively from this area, using their own staff and resources. However, there is a need to ensure that recruiting does not solely become based upon provincial boundaries. If the number of recruits in an area exceeds the capacity of the units, a waiting list could be maintained. Prospective recruits would have a choice of either to wait for a vacancy in that regiment or join another unit which would accept him immediately. Just because regiments have certain defined recruiting areas, it is not suggested that everyone who lives in that given area is restricted to enlisting in that regiment. The training of each regiment and its new recruits would be the responsibility of the regiment. Specialized training at appropriate schools would remain the responsibility of the current system, except that nominations for attendance would come from the various regiments.

With recruiting being restricted to a general location, a need exists for a monitoring system to ensure that each regiment maintains a socio-demographic mix, in agreement with that of the area.

The result of a reorganization would see the establishment of the regimental headquarters, an actual home battalion, a reserve battalion, a central recruiting station, and a training center co-located. The number of battalions can be variable, but each regiment would have a rotational system whereby battalions would serve overseas.

Over-all a good case can be made for the adoption of a regimental system, based on military efficiency particularly the esprit de corps which results from such a system. The system is particularly attractive in terms of volunteer armed forces because it offers the man a life in the forces, rather than just a career. Regimental members become part of a recognizable and manageable social unit, rather than a cog in an immense, bureaucratic machine. The recruit of a regimental organization is able to alleviate the fears that he may have of losing control of his destiny. [National Technical Information Service, 1972.]

Currently the regimental system has only been applied to armies, however there is no reason why the system could not be adopted for all elements of the armed forces of a country. Although the problem of sea-shore rotation is a difficulty for any naval service.

The British regimental system has worked well in Britain and a number of her colonies, but perhaps the system is not suitable for adoption by the American armed forces. Because of social and cultural backgrounds the successful adoption of a suitable organization structure in one country does not guarantee a successful "transplant" in another environment. "Americans are notoriously unhistorical minded and are often oblivious to traditions and precedents, particularly those elements of society which are likely to be recruited into a professional army." [National Technical Information Service, 1972. p. V-5.]

American society would be reluctant to return to a draft or a selective service concept. The all-volunteer concept is expensive and is not attracting recruits as anticipated. The above discussion on the reigmental system must provide another alternative which should be investigated as a means of motivating persons into the volunteer services.

VI. <u>SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION</u>

The purpose of this thesis has been to indicate that
the armed forces of the U. S. are an extension of the society
which they are designed to protect. There is probably a
great deal of truth in the adage that a democracy gets the
military establishment it deserves.

Currently it would appear that the American armed forces
are out of touch with society. Aspects of their structure
and life style are antiquated, the officer and a gentleman
concept dates back to the seventeenth century. Society has
changed radically, the armed forces have adopted few changes.
In order to avoid change the American military has attempted
to pursue an isolation policy. Such a policy causes problems
as the military is unable or unwilling to adjust to the dyna-
mic nature of society.

One may question the assumption that an isolation policy
is not an acceptable policy for the armed forces to pursue.

It is the author's contention that it is essential in a
democratic society for the military to be supported by society.
The United States and France before her both had difficulties
in Vietnam due to the lack of support for their armed forces
by the society remaining at home. It could be noted that all

111

armed forces, regardless of their ideology, require support from society.

The following quote by Hsiao Hua, General Political Department Director of the Chinese Army, and a member of the Military Affairs Standing Committee, indicates that even a communist soldier must reflect his society.

> "Since our Army is the army of the people, it must regularly maintain close relations with the masses, and nourish itself with what is acquired from the struggles waged by the masses. Unless this is done, the Army will be like a tree that has no root, a stream whose source has dried up, and so will its vitality and combat strength."

[Gittings, 1967. p. 176.]

Support of the U. S. armed forces can only be fully achieved if the society values, trusts, and respects the armed forces. The process of decline of mass armies and the Vietnam conflict have indicated that this trust and respect has not been forthcoming.

The three concepts of value, trust, and respect can only be achieved if the armed forces do not appear to be an essentially alien organization within the society. The armed forces must attempt to break away from their bases, become exposed to civilian universities, and participate in local civic activities at all levels.

Because the armed forces have a special role of defense they must monopolize the nation's major weapon systems and because of this fact there will always be some degree of alienation between the armed forces and society. However, the military must remember that it is up to society, not them, to judge whether the degree of alienation is excessive. The military may complain about society becoming decadent, permissive, and immoral. Society is dynamic and has the right to diverge from previous norms of conduct. The military may not accept these new norms, in which case society has the final judgement. Society voices her judgement by means of approval of the military budget, and in whether or not sufficient qualified young men join and remain in the armed forces. [Rosser, 1973.]

It would appear that military planners in association with political leaders must adopt a flow procedure to ensure that current alienation decreases, while at the same time attempt to predict areas of future change. The procedure contains seven possible steps, namely:

1. Acknowledgement of the problem.

2. Selection of alternatives available.

3. Selection of the best alternative.

4. Definition of the objective.

5. Allocation of the available resources.

6. Implementation of the program.

7. Updating and program monitoring.

A. ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

The purpose of this thesis has been to direct military planners to the fact that there is a problem in having a society that is alienated towards the military and if the all-volunteer system is to be a success then there is need for corrective action. Once the need for change has been accepted then "half the battle is over."

B. ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE

An effective military force is vital to U. S. foreign policy. In order to ensure this effective force there are four possible alternatives available. First, with a decline in military capabilities it is possible to merely redefine and narrow the nation's defense and foreign policy goals. By so doing, it does not really matter if a degree of alienation between society and the military exists, because the military is so small. Britain and Canada have both adopted this alternative over the last decade. [Rosser, 1973.] The alternative is not feasible for that of a super power.

A second alternative is for the military to convince society that a new threat to the national security exists. By so doing, the military is able to increase its size and capabilities of its forces. Any perceived threat must be based on fact. A potential enemy must exist and must provide some form of a threat, which in turn must increase the uncertainty about the

114

survival of the nation. This alternative does not appear viable considering the world political environment and the power which can be brought to bear on such a policy by the free press.

The third and fourth alternative are both within the power of the military to effect. The third is that the military can attempt to maintain its operational effectiveness by isolating itself from society. That is, accept the traditional military model as expanded in Chapter III.

Model I, the civilianized military, or Model II, the pluralistic military, as detailed in Chapter III, provide the other alternatives available to military planners.

C. SELECTION OF THE BEST ALTERNATIVE

Reflecting on the four alternatives, the fourth is considered the only acceptable, workable alternative to be adopted if the U. S. armed forces is to alienate itself with the community it serves.

D. DEFINITION OF THE OBJECTIVE

Since society and the armed forces are not aligned in areas of value, trust, and respect, there is an urgent need to develop a program to ensure both elements converge. The military planners must define an objective which is not only maintainable but also acceptable to society. If this objective means a complete re-organization, such as the adoption of the regimental concept would need, it must be done.

E.   ALLOCATION OF THE AVAILABLE RESOURCES

Congress and the military must be prepared to allocate the necessary resources required to implement such a program. Since society has budgetary control, then they should be only too willing to provide the necessary capital. The development of such a program will require intensive research by military sociologists. This is a problem in itself as sociology of the military encounters resistance from the more liberal academic disciplines, also the field has been dominated by a few individuals and it has been difficult for younger sociologists with new or differing perspectives to develop their interests and gain acceptance. [Dobratz, 1976.]

Greater effort must be made by the military and academia to expand and develop the field of sociology of the military.

F.   IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROGRAM

Like any program which envolves change there will be considerable resistance. The planning staff must attempt to reduce this resistence by a good implementation procedure. The planning staff should also be responsible to ensure that the program monitors the future direction of social values and changes so that corrective action can be initiated early, so as to prevent the current situation from developing in the future.

The thesis has attempted to indicate some of the areas which need attention; it has also indicated possible solutions. It is also acknowledged how difficult the proposed change would be for the military. The coming generation of military leaders should examine objectively the issues raised and attempt to discard dogma which cannot be purely supported by operational effectiveness. The armed forces of America must reflect the rest of American society.

LIST OF REFERENCES

1. American Institute for Research, R74-4, Experimental Incentives as an Influence on Enlistment Intention: More is not Better, by Frey, R. L. et al., June 1974.

2. Bacham, G. G. and Johnston, J., "The All-Volunteer Armed Force: Not Whether But What Kind," Psychology Today, v. 6, p. 113-128, October 1972.

3. Blakeley, H. W., "Esprit De What? Our Army and Morale," Military Review, v. 35, pp. 3-7, September 1955.

4. Bliven, B., "All Volunteer Armed Forces," The New Yorker, pp. 55-81 and 137-156, 24 November 1975 and 1 December 1975.

5. Bradford, Z. B., and Brown, F. J., The United States Army in Transition, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1973.

6. Carter, W. L., An Example of Human Resource Accounting, paper presented at Industrial Psychology, Naval Post-graduate School, Monterey, CA., 1 June 1977.

7. Castle, M. J., Women (and Men) in the U. S. Army: A Study in Optimal Utilization, M. Sc. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, December 1976.

8. Coates, C. H., and Pellegrin, R. J., Military Sociology: A Study of American Military Institutions and Military Life, The Social Science Press, University Park, MD., 1965.

9. Cortright, D., Soldiers in Revolt: The American Military Today, Anchor Press Doubleday, New York, NY, 1975.

10. De Stefano, A., "Is All Well With the Volunteer Military," Intellect, v. 104, pp. 560-562, May-June 1976.

11. Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower: The Key-stone of National Security, Report to the President and the Congress, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., April 1976.

12. Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower Commission Staff Studies and Supporting Papers, Volumes I - V, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., May 1976.

13. Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower Commission: Organizing the Military Services into a Union, Report to the President and the Congress, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., August 1975.

14. DFO, Annual Report 1976, Report of the Defence Force Ombudsman for Period 25 December 1975 to 25 November 1976, Office of DFO, Government Printer, Canberra, December 1976.

15. Dobratz, B. A. and Kourvetaris, G.A., "The Present State and Development of Sociology of the Military," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, v. 4 (Spring), pp. 67-105, 1976.

16. Doorn, J. Van., The Soldier and Social Change, Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1975.

17. Dunwell, R. P., "Erosion of an Ethic," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, v. 64, pp. 57-62, March 1977.

18. Fisher, C. E., "Don't Give Up The Regiment," The Army Combat Forces Journal, v. 6, No. 5, pp. 26-28, December 1955.

19. Fisher, A. and Harford, M., Trends in Enlistment Motivation, Manpower Research Report, MA73-1b, September 1973.

20. Ganoe, W. A., The History of the United States Army, Eric Lundberg, Maryland, 1964.

21. Gard, R. G., "The Military and American Society," Foreign Affairs, v. 49, Number 4, pp. 698-710, July 1971

22. Gelber, H. G., Problems of Australian Defence, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1970.

23. Gellerman, S. W., Management by Motivation, American Management Association, Inc., 1968.

24. Gittings, J., The Role of the Chinese Army, Oxford University Press, New York, 1967.

25. Häckel, E., "Military Manpower and Political Purpose, Adelphi Papers, No. 72," London: Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 1-34, 1970.

26. Harries-Jenkins, G., "From Conscription to Volunteer Armies, Adelphi Papers, No. 103," London: Institute for Strategic Studies, pp. 11-16, 1973.

27. Hollister, C. W., <u>The Military Organization of Norman England</u>, The Claredon Press, Oxford, 1965.

28. Huntington, S. P., <u>The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations</u>, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1964.

29. Janowitz, M., <u>The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait</u>, The Free Press, New York, 1960.

30. Janowitz, M., "Volunteer Armed Forces and Military Purpose," <u>Foreign Affairs</u>, v. 50, pp. 427-443, April 1972.

31. Janowitz, M., "Toward an All-Volunteer Military," <u>The Public Interest</u>, v. 27, pp. 104-117, Spring 1972.

32. Janowitz, M., "The U. S. Forces and the Zero Draft, Adelphi Papers, No. 94," <u>London: Institute for Strategic Studies</u>, pp. 1-30, 1973.

33. Johannessen, L. C., <u>Women Management</u>, DRRI Army Phase II RB4-2, 10 May 1976.

34. Killian, R. A., <u>Human Resource Management An ROI Approach</u>, AMACOM, New York, 1976.

35. Kim, K. H., Farrell, S., and Clague, E., <u>The All-Volunteer Army: An Analysis of Demand and Supply</u>, Praeger Publishers, New York, 1971.

36. Kirchheimer, O., "Confining Conditions and Revolutionary Breakthroughs," <u>The American Political Science Review</u>, v. LIX, pp. 964-974, 1965.

37. Knorr, K., "The United States: Social Change and Military Power, Adelphi Papers, No. 71," <u>London: Institute for Strategic Studies</u>, pp. 1-12, 1970.

38. Lee, G., "Britain's Professionals," <u>Army</u>, pp.28-33, July 1971.

39. Levinson, P., "Asinine Attitudes Toward Motivation," <u>Harvard Business Review</u>, v. 20, pp. 70-76, January-February 1973.

40. Little R., "Buddy Relations and Combat Performance," Janowitz, M. ed: <u>The New Military. Norton and Company</u>, New York, pp. 195-223, 1964.

41. Little, R. W., Selective Service and American Society, Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 1969.

42. Lockmiller, D. A., Enoch H. Crowder, Columbus: University of Missouri Studies, 1955.

43. Mayew, W. L., The Regimental System in the United States Army: Its Evolution and Future, Master of Military Arts and Science, U. S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1976.

44. McClelland, D. C., "Money as a Motivator: Some Research Insights," The McKinsey Quarterly, pp. 366-377, Fall 1967.

45. Moskos, C. C., "Why Men Fight," Transaction, pp. 13-23, November 1969.

46. Moskos, C. C., "The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional or Plural?", Trager, F., and Kronenberg, P., ed: National Security and American Society. University Press of Kansas, pp. 536-549, 1973.

47. Mulliken, J., "Humanizing the U. S. Military," Time, v. 96, No. 25, pp. 16-22, December 21, 1970.

48. National Technical Information Service, HI-1647-RR, Ideas and Trends for the Modern Volunteer Army, by Singer, M., et. al., June 1972.

49. Paget, J., "The British Regimental System," Combat Forces Journal, v. 4, No. 11, pp. 30-32, June 1954.

50. Rosser, R. F., "Civil-Military Relations in the 1980's," Military Review, v. LII, No. 3, pp. 18-31, March 1972.

51. Rosser, R. F., "A 20th Century Military Force," Foreign Policy, v. 12, pp. 156-175, Fall 1973.

52. Stouffer, S. A., and others, The American Soldier, Volume II: Combat and Its Aftermath, Princeton University Press, 1949.

53. Tax, S., The Draft: A Handbook of Facts and Alternatives, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1966.

54. Towell, P., "After 4 Years: Concern Over Volunteer Army," Congressional Quarterly Inc., v. 35, pp. 528-533, March 26, 1977.

55. U. S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1966-1975, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., December 1976.

56. U. S. Army, Women in the Army Study Group, Women in the Army, (Draft), Washington, D. C., August 1976.

57. U. S. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, Report, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., February 20, 1970.

58. Waldman, E., The Goose Step is Verboten: The German Army Today, The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964.

59. Weigley, R. F., History of the United States Army, Macmillan Co., New York, 1967.

60. Wrightsman, L. S., Social Psychology in the Seventies, Brocks, Cole, 1972.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

No. Copies

1. Defense Documentation Center   2
   Cameron Station
   Alexandria, Virginia 22314

2. Library, Code 0142   2
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California 93940

3. Department Chairman, Code 54   1
   Department of Administrative Science
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California 93940

4. Professor J. W. Creighton, Code 54Cf   1
   Department of Administrative Science
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California 93940

5. CDR R. A. McGonigal, Code 54Mb   2
   Department of Administrative Science
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California 93940

6. Mr. M. Janowitz   1
   Distinguished Professor
   School of Sociology
   University of Chicago
   Chicago, Illinois 60607

7. Professor J. Arima, Code 54Aa   1
   Department of Administrative Science
   Naval Postgraduate School
   Monterey, California 93940

8. LT GEN D. B. Dunstan, CB CBE MBE   1
   Army Chief of the General Staff
   Russell Offices
   Canberra, ACT 2600
   Australia

9. Colonel M. J. Lamborn   1
   Deputy Director of Supply
   P. O. Box 1932R
   G P O Melbourne, 3001
   Australia

10. Mr. R. Elster   1
    1667 Westwind Way
    McLean, Virginia 22101

11. Major P. E. Bunyan, RAAOC   2
    219 Hindmarsh Drive
    Revitt ACT 2611
    Australia

12. Australian Army Attache   2
    1601 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
    Washington, D. C. 20036

13. The Librarian   1
    Bridges Memorial Library
    Royal Military College
    Duntroon, ACT 2600
    Australia

14. The Librarian   1
    Department of Defence Library
    Russell Offices
    Canberra, ACT 2600
    Australia

15. The Librarian   1
    Department of Defence (Army Office) Library
    Campbell Park Offices
    Canberra, ACT 2600
    Australia

16. Pers 61   1
    Bureau of Naval Personnel
    Washington, D. C. 20370

17. Pers 62   1
    Bureau of Naval Personnel
    Washington, D. C. 20370